The Journal of The DuPage County Bar Association

Back Issues > Vol. 23 (2010-11)

Does the Public Zoning Process in Illinois Inhibit Economic Development? Lessons Learned from Navistar’s Move to Lisle
by Gregory W. Jones and Leonard M. Monson

A recent zoning matter in the Village of Lisle caught the attention of the economic development community, not only in Lisle, but also at the county and state levels.  In May of 2010, Navistar, Inc. appeared to have abandoned its effort to relocate its international headquarters to Lisle, Illinois.[1]  This occurred when Navistar’s petition for a special use permit, to make a number of improvements to the former Alcatel-Lucent campus, including constructing a technology center and additional parking,[2] was met with a flurry of procedural and substantive questions by counsel hired to represent a group of residents opposed to the proposal.[3]  Navistar’s decision to walk away from its Lisle proposal was the culmination of a nine-month period involving seven public hearings with Lisle’s Planning and Zoning Commission, including a marathon seven-hour special meeting held on a Saturday, the subpoena of two dozen officials related in various capacities to Navistar, and hours of cross examination by the opposition’s counsel.[4] Only after extensive efforts by the Governor’s office, the State’s Attorneys Office, and DuPage County, was it recently announced that Navistar would renew its efforts to move to Lisle.[5]  While there was no official public comment by Navistar, its Vice President and Chief Information Officer indicated that the initial decision to walk away from Lisle was partially based on the company being “put on trial” through Lisle’s zoning hearing process.[6] 

This article seeks to answer whether the public zoning process inhibits economic development in Illinois.  Using Navistar’s recent experience with the Village of Lisle as a case study, this article reviews the legal basis for using judicial procedures during zoning hearings as well as recent legislation and case law defining what due process rights are required at zoning hearings.  Lastly, this article recommends steps a governmental body can take during a zoning hearing to provide essential due process protections without undermining the state’s ability to preserve and grow its economy. 

Klaeren v. The Village of Lisle.  Those opposing Navistar’s relocation bid relied heavily on cross examining and subpoenaing witnesses during public hearings to discuss zoning matters associated with the proposal.  The authority to cross examine and subpoena witnesses during zoning hearings is largely derived from the Illinois Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in People ex rel Klaeren v. Village of Lisle,[7] which held that a municipality must allow some form of cross-examination of witnesses during a public hearing for a special use petition.

In Klaeren, after the Meijer grocery store chain’s petition for annexation, rezoning and a special use for a planned unit development had been approved by Lisle’s Village Board, neighboring landowners sued the Village of Lisle, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent continuation of site preparation for a proposed grocery store.[8]  The neighboring landowners alleged that Lisle’s zoning hearings were procedurally defective and that their due process rights were violated as a result.[9] 

The Klaeren record revealed that Lisle conducted a public hearing on Meijer’s petition which attracted a large audience.[10]  The record further indicates that, at the public hearing, the Mayor of Lisle stated that “There will be no attempt at tonight’s hearing to answer any questions raised by the audience”,  and “I ask that you limit your comments to two minutes each.”[11]  The trial court ultimately granted the injunction holding that the mayor could impose reasonable conditions, but not totally deny cross examination of witnesses for Meijer.[12] 

On appeal, the Second District appellate court concurred with the trial court’s findings that existing case law required the protection of due process rights and held that certain  actions taken by a governmental body, i.e. special use permits, are more “administrative”, and therefore full procedural due process rights must be provided during the zoning hearing.[13]  The appellate court specifically stated that the right to cross examine witnesses is part of the procedural due process rights required to be provided during zoning hearings.[14] 

Additionally, the appellate court held that judicial review of a governmental body’s administrative decision may only be based on the record established at the administrative level and that the court may not consider any extrinsic evidence.[15]  In other words, challenges to a governmental body’s zoning decision may not be heard de novo and may only be based on the record established at the zoning hearing.[16]  Understandably, increased due process rights for zoning hearings concerning administrative decisions are necessary to successfully develop and preserve a full record that will serve as the sole basis for future judicial review.

Meijer appealed the Second District’s decision to the Illinois Supreme Court, which was unwilling to adopt the appellate court’s holding that a “public hearing before any tribunal or body includes the full panoply of due process rights.”[17]  The Court specifically stated:

“To construe so broadly the phrase ‘public hearing’ may be inappropriate in some instances. Thus, the appellate majority too strictly relied on the Municipal Code for its resolution of this cause.  The resolution of this cause instead depends upon the distinction between legislative hearings and administrative hearings before municipal bodies.”[18]

Affirming the appellate court in pertinent part, the Illinois Supreme Court held that “municipal bodies act in administrative or quasi-judicial capacities when [conducting] zoning hearings concerning a special use petition,” and that an administrative standard of judicial review applied to all challenges to special use petitions.[19]  The Supreme Court’s decision significantly altered how zoning hearings are conducted in Illinois.

Historical Standard of Review for Zoning Matters. Prior to the Klaeren case, it had long been held that zoning decisions were a legislative matter.  In the seminal zoning case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,[20] the United States Supreme Court recognized that a governmental body’s determination of the compatibility of land uses and the restriction of those uses to separate districts is an exercise of legislative wisdom, and therefore limited only by substantive due process.  Substantive due process provides that “such regulation is unconstitutional if it is arbitrary and unreasonable and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”[21]  Therefore, when courts are faced with a challenge to a government agency’s zoning decision, they typically review the decision for arbitrariness and unreasonableness.

Before the Klaeren decision, Illinois applied Euclid’s legislative standard of review to challenged zoning decisions.[22]  However, Klaeren’s holding that “municipal bodies act in administrative or quasi-judicial capacities when those bodies conduct zoning hearings concerning a special use petition” was a clear break with Illinois’ precedent.[23] This decision replaced the legislative standard of judicial review (i.e. Euclid’s standard of review) traditionally applied to special use petitions with an administrative standard of review,[24] which is “governed by the fundamental principles and requirements of due process of law.”[25]  Unlike the legislative standard of review, which allows the introduction of evidence outside of the record created at the zoning hearing, the administrative standard of review relies solely on the record created at the zoning hearing.[26]  Due to the court’s ability to rely only on the record, hearings at which governmental bodies make administrative decisions  require greater procedural due process protections. 

While the Illinois Supreme Court clearly changed the standard of review for special use decisions with Klaeren, it provided less guidance regarding what steps a governmental body must take to protect due process rights during a zoning hearing.[27]  Although Klaeren provided a general framework to guide municipalities on providing appropriate due process rights at zoning hearings, that framework is prefaced by the court stating, “Due process is an elusive concept.  Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts.”[28]  Klaeren’s emphasis on determining what due process protections are warranted on a case-by-case basis  introduced equal measures of uncertainty and unpredictability to the zoning hearing process.

Post-Klaeren Decisions. On the heels of Klaeren, the First District in Lapp v. Village of Winnetka[29] provided some insight regarding what due process rights need to be provided at a zoning hearing.  Lapp held that a municipality was not obligated to allow cross examination during a village board meeting at which a special use petition was being considered.[30]   The controversy in Lapp centered on a group of residents that alleged that the Village of Winnetka violated Klaeren’s due process guarantees by denying residents the right to cross-examine a witness at a village board meeting.[31]  The court sided with the village, noting that the residents had an opportunity to cross examine witnesses and present evidence at a prior public hearing with the zoning board of appeals, and therefore were afforded due process consistent with fundamental principles of justice.[32]  Relying extensively on Klaeren’s interpretation that “the right to cross examine is not unlimited and may be tailored by the municipality to the circumstances specifically before it,” Lapp engaged in intensive factual analysis and delved deep into how the zoning hearings were conducted.[33]  Lapp paid particular attention to the fact that residents were able to cross examine witnesses at some point during the zoning hearing process.[34] 

While Lapp began to identify the boundaries of due process required at zoning hearings, its emphasis on permitting some form of cross examination illustrates the impact of Klaeren’s holding that special use petitions be subject to an administrative standard of review.  Courts applying an administrative standard of review may only consider the record established during the public hearing, therefore making it necessary for governmental bodies to provide extensive procedural due process rights during zoning hearings in order to fully develop the record.[35] Lapp’s reliance on Klaeren’s fact intensive, case-by-case approach makes it unclear as to whether Lapp’s modest limitations on cross examination would be upheld under different factual circumstances.[36]  Although Lapp provided some clarity regarding the bounds of due process at zoning hearings, the vast majority of the questions raised by Klaeren remained unanswered.

The Legislature’s Response to Klaeren. The Illinois legislature responded to the due process ambiguities raised by Klaeren first in 2006 with Public Act 94-1027 and subsequently with Public Act 95-0843.[37]  In an effort to prevent zoning hearings from turning into mini-trials, the legislature lessened a municipality’s need to develop and preserve the record at public hearings by subjecting all zoning decisions to a legislative standard of judicial review.[38]  Unlike the administrative standard of review, legislative review allows the court to consider matters beyond those entered into the record at a zoning hearing.[39] 

Public Act 94-1027 stated that “any special use, variance, rezoning or other amendment to a zoning ordinance adopted by [the local government authorities] shall be subject to de novo judicial review as a legislative decision, regardless of whether the process of its adoption is considered administrative for other purposes.”[40]  Although the Act’s language appears to be relatively clear on its face, the Second District in Millineum Maintenance Management, Inc. v. County of Lake,[41] held that a court is only required to apply a legislative standard of review when a party challenges a governmental authority’s approval of a special use petition. The court’s decision turned largely on the “adopted by” language in the Act, which was interpreted to mean that the Act only applied when a government authority approves a request for zoning relief.[42]  As a result of the “adopted by” reference, the court held a party challenging a governmental authority’s denial of a special use petition would be subject to an administrative standard of review in accordance with Klaeren’s holding.[43] 

In response to the Second District’s decision in Millineum, the legislature adopted Public Act 95-0843, which eliminated the “adopted by” language to impose a legislative standard of review for all zoning decisions, regardless of whether a government authority approved or denied zoning relief.[44]  The Act was the legislature’s attempt to avoid repeating Millineum’s outcome by subject all zoning decisions to legislative judicial review.[45]

Shortly after Public Act 95-0843 became effective, the Second District issued its opinion in Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville[46] overturning Millineum and holding that a “city’s denial of [a] special use permit application must receive ‘de novo judicial review as a legislative decision.’”  In Our Savior, a church appealed the City of Aurora’s denial of a special use petition for a building expansion and related site improvements.[47]  The Second District ultimately remanded the decision with instructions to apply a legislative standard of review consistent with the language of the Public Act 95-0843.[48]  Importantly, while the Our Savior decision was consistent with the judicial review mandate contained in the Act, the court expressly stated that the Act does not “limit... the application of due process to any [zoning] decisions.”[49]  In other words, the court held that the Act did not address what procedural due process rights are required at zoning hearing.

Due Process Rights Today And The Navistar Hearings. Passage of Public Act 95-0843 and the Second District’s application of legislative review in Our Savior eliminate the need to preserve a zoning hearing’s record for administrative review, but substantial ambiguity persists about what procedural due process rights Klaeren requires at a zoning hearing.  Our Savior declined to interpret the Act as reducing due process rights required to be provided at zoning hearings.  Because of the limited scope of the Our Savior decision, Klaeren continues to provide the most pertinent guide on what rights need to be provided at zoning hearings.

While Klaeren does not provide definitive guidance on what due process rights need be provided in every case, it does provide a rough framework to guide governmental bodies when determining the appropriateness, or degree, of due process required in a zoning matter.[50]

The primary goal of due process is the full and true disclosure of relevant and reasonable facts.  With that in mind, Klaeren identifies the following factors to apply when determining what due process rights should be provided at a zoning hearing: (1) degree of adversity of interested parties; (2) complexity of the issues involved; (3) technical nature of the petition; and (4) degree of disputed factors.[51]

Navistar’s special use petition included the development of a technology center that would have included diesel engine testing cells.  Also, there was a strong, well-organized group of objectors that retained attorneys and technical experts. The existence of the technical issues combined with well-organized opposition tended to support the Village of Lisle’s use of measures to provide greater due process rights.  Lisle elected to allow extensive cross-examination and even granted subpoena powers, which the opposition exercised on top executives of Navistar, among others.  In this instance, the use of cross-examination was clearly supported by the courts’ decisions in Klaeren, Lapp, and Our Savior

The authors of this article, however, question the use of subpoena powers in a zoning matter.  The Illinois legislature, as supported by the finding in Our Savior, made it clear that the judicial standard of review for zoning matters is de novo, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the record at a zoning hearing does not have to be preserved.[52]  Further, objectors to a petition may produce their own experts at a zoning hearing to counter the testimony of the petitioner’s experts, thus providing a meaningful opportunity to present relevant and reasonable facts to the governmental body.  Additionally, the de novo standard of judicial review provides all parties with full subpoena powers during judicial proceedings, therefore decreasing the need for those powers to be provided during zoning hearings. 

In Navistar’s case, it is difficult to understand what probative value the production of the CEO of an international company during a zoning hearing would bring to a local zoning matter of which he may have limited personal knowledge.  Even in judicial proceedings, corporate officers without personal knowledge of the matter at issue are not typically required to testify to the veracity of statements made by the corporation’s designated agents that possess actual knowledge of the matter.[53]  Within the context of a zoning hearing, large corporations generally hire a slew of professional consultants to analyze varied zoning and engineering issues that the corporation’s CEO is normally unfamiliar with.  Seemingly, cross examining the corporation’s professional consultants that were hired to address the corporation’s zoning issues is a more direct way to discover the pertinent facts related to a matter than subpoenaing a corporation’s CEO to discuss matters with which he is unfamiliar.  It is the authors’ opinion that the rights afforded to zoning hearing participants and the ability of all parties to call witnesses in court diminish the need for a governmental body to provide subpoena powers in a zoning matter.

Although the courts have been clear that the outright exclusion of cross-examination violates due process guarantees, Klaeren provides very helpful insight as to appropriate limitations governmental bodies may impose on the right to cross-examination, including:[54]

(1) Limiting who may exercise the right of cross-examination, by: (a) requiring allegations of some special interest, beyond that of the general public; or (b) requiring that the party register in advance; or (c) creation of a presumptive right to an identified class (i.e. immediate neighbors);

(2) Limiting exercise of right to cross-examination to the subject matter, based on: (a) complexity of the issue; (b) special expertise of the witness; (c) only disputed factors; (d) testimony of taste or personal opinion; or (e) the degree to which the witness’s testimony relates to the factors to be considered in approving the proposal; and

(3) Adoption of rules specifying which factual issues may be relevant consideration for policy makers.[55] Such adoption may be made either immediately after testimony or in advance.

It should be no surprise that after the Village of Lisle’s decision to prohibit cross-examination in Klaeren was rejected by the courts, the new Lisle administration (that presumably came to power or learned a “lesson” from the backlash of the Klaeren matter) chose to not impose many limitations and grant extensive cross-examination and subpoena powers to the objectors with the Navistar petition.  It is clear from the holdings in Klaeren, Lapp and Our Savior, that this decision was entirely within the village’s power.  However, as evidenced by Navistar’s initial withdrawal of their petition for “being put on trial,” overly extensive use of cross-examination and subpoenas, may have been unnecessary and could have a chilling effect on economic development.[56] 

Using Navistar’s experience with Lisle as an example, the answer to the question raised by this article,  “does Illinois’ current zoning process unjustly inhibit economic development,” is a resounding “maybe.”  It is clear that Klaeren and its progeny provide governmental bodies with broad discretion to define what due process rights are provided at zoning hearings.[57]  It is also clear that Klaeren’s emphasis on tailoring due process protections on a case-by-case basis fosters unpredictability at zoning hearings,[58] which generally does not motivate the business community to invest.  However, while a degree of unpredictability is characteristic to any zoning proceeding, Klaeren does provide valuable guidance to governmental bodies on how to ensure that zoning hearings serve their intended purpose, namely to produce facts that are relevant to a proposal.[59]  How closely governmental bodies follow Klaeren’s framework, however, may vary widely from case to case.

Navistar’s objections to Lisle’s zoning process did not appear to be based on an unwillingness to allow its experts to provide relevant facts regarding the relocation during the zoning hearings.  Rather, Navistar objected to Lisle allowing the opposition to put the company on trial at a zoning hearing by permitting the subpoena of Navistar executives with limited personal knowledge of the company’s relocation effort.[60]  While it appears that Illinois’ public zoning process did not dampen the state’s economic development efforts, it may have been Lisle’s willingness to provide due process protection greatly in excess of the due process rights protected by Klaeren’s framework that caused Navistar to initially abandon its move to Lisle.

Although Klaeren is far from dispositive on questions concerning due process rights, the authors believe that the reasonable application of Klaeren’s framework tempered by the ultimate goal of full and true disclosure of relevant and reasonable facts may be used by governmental bodies to determine an appropriate degree of due process needed at zoning hearings.  The impact of Illinois’ zoning process on the state’s economic development climate therefore relies on the diligence of the governmental bodies applying Klaeren’s framework to ensure that zoning hearings produce relevant facts and avoid procedural boondoggles.

[1] See Sherry Slater, Navistar Staying – For Now, Journal Gazette, May 27, 2010, available at http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20100527/BIZ/305279937/1031/BIZ.

[2] See Jillane Kleinschmidt, Navistar to Move to Lisle, Navistar News, September 8, 2010, available at http://media.navistar.com/index.php?s=43&item=426.

[3] See Transcript of Record at 54, Village of Lisle Planning and Zoning Commission Public Hearing (September 16, 2009).

[4] See David Weese, Navistar Pulls Out of Proposed World Headquarters Site in Lisle, Fox Valley Labor News, June 1, 2010, available at http://foxvalleylabornews.com/news/?p=632.

[5] See Jack Griffin & Marco Santana, Navistar, State Forge Deal on Navistar Move, Daily Herald, September 8, 2010, available at http://saxo.dailyherald.com/article/20100908/Business/309089820/.

[6] See also David Weese, Navistar Pulls Out of Proposed World Headquarters Site in Lisle, Fox Valley Labor News, June 1, 2010, available at http://foxvalleylabornews.com/news/?p=632.

[7] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223 (2002).

[8] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 224-25 (2002).

[9] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 225 (2002).

[10] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 25 (2002).

[11] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 225-26 (2002).

[12] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 229 (2002).

[13] See People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 316 Ill. App. 3d 770, 737 N.E.2d 1099, 1107-1110 (2nd Dist. 2002).

[14] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 316 Ill. App. 3d 770, 737 N.E.2d 1099, 1109 (2nd Dist. 2002).

[15] 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (2006).

[16] See Acevedo v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 324 Ill.App.3d 768, 755 N.E.2d 93, 97 (1st Dist. 2001). 

[17] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 233 (2002).

[18] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 233 (2002).

[19] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 234 (2002).

[20] Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 295, 4 S.Ct. 114 (1926).

[21] Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 295, 4 S.Ct. 114 (1926).

[22] See, e.g. La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill.2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65, 68-69 (1957) (providing same level of deference as Euclid to governmental body’s legislative actions). 

[23] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 234 (2002) (emphasis added).

[24] See George L. Schoenbeck, Illinois Zoning Law Six Years After Klaeren, 97 Ill. B.J. 84 (2009), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6997/is_2_97/ai_n31352764/?tag=content;col1.

[25] See People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 234 (2002). 

[26] See Acevedo v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 324 Ill.App.3d 768, 755 N.E.2d 93, 97 (1st Dist. 2001). 

[27] See People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 234 (2002) (stating that administrative hearings must comply with the “fundamental principles and requirements of due process of law,” but failing to elaborate on how to meet that standard). 

[28] See People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 234 (2002)

[29] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983 (1st Dist. 2005).

[30] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983, 994-95 (1st Dist. 2005).

[31] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983, 993 (1st Dist. 2005).

[32] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983, 994 (1st Dist. 2005).

[33] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983, 994 (1st Dist. 2005).

[34] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983, 994 (1st Dist. 2005).

[35] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983, 995-96 (1st Dist. 2005).

[36] Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 833 N.E.2d 983, 994 (1st Dist. 2005).

[37] See George L. Schoenbeck, Illinois Zoning Law Six Years After Klaeren, 97 Ill. B.J. 84 (2009), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6997/is_2_97/ai_n31352764/?tag=content;col1.

[38] See George L. Schoenbeck, Illinois Zoning Law Six Years After Klaeren, 97 Ill. B.J. 84 (2009), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6997/is_2_97/ai_n31352764/?tag=content;col1.

[39] Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143,1162 (2nd Dist. 2009).

[40] See 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1 (2006); 65 ILCS 5/11-13-25 (2006).

[41] See Millineum  Maint. Mgmt., Inc., v. County of Lake, 384 Ill. App. 3d 638, 894 N.E.2d 845, 856 (2nd Dist. 2008).

[42] See Millineum  Maint. Mgmt., Inc., v. County of Lake, 384 Ill. App. 3d 638, 894 N.E.2d 845, 856 (2nd Dist. 2008).

[43] See Millineum Maint. Mgmt., Inc., v. County of Lake, 384 Ill. App. 3d 638, 894 N.E.2d 845, 861 (2nd Dist. 2008).

[44] See 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1 (2008); 60 ILCS 1/110-50.1 (2008); 65 ILCS 5/11-13-25 (2008). See also Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1026, 922 N.E.2d 1143 (2nd Dist. 2009) (discussing the amendment to 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1 and its impact on the decision in Millineum). 

[45] See George L. Schoenbeck, Illinois Zoning Law Six Years After Klaeren, 97 Ill. B.J. 84 (2009), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6997/is_2_97/ai_n31352764/?tag=content;col1.

[46] Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143,1161 (2nd Dist. 2009).

[47] Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143,1145 (2nd Dist. 2009).

[48] Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143,1162 (2nd Dist. 2009).

[49] Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143,1162 (2nd Dist. 2009).

[50] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 235-36 (2002).

[51] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 235-36 (2002).

[52] See 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1 (2008); 60 ILCS 1/110-50.1 (2008); 65 ILCS 5/11-13-25 (2008).

[53] See People v. Enis, 139 Ill.2d 264, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1167 (1990) (“It is improper, however, to ask a witness to speculate about matters beyond his personal knowledge or to judge the veracity of other witnesses or evidence.”).

[54] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 235-36 (2002).

[55] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 235-36 (2002).

[56] See David Weese, Navistar Pulls Out of Proposed World Headquarters Site in Lisle, Fox Valley Labor News, June 1, 2010, available at http://foxvalleylabornews.com/news/?p=632.

[57] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 234 (2002).

[58] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 234 (2002).

[59] People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 202 Ill.2d 164, 781 N.E.2d. 223, 235-36 (2002).

[60] See David Weese, Navistar Pulls Out of Proposed World Headquarters Site in Lisle, Fox Valley Labor News, June 1, 2010, available at http://foxvalleylabornews.com/news/?p=632.

Leonard M. Monson is a partner with the law firm of Kuhn, Heap & Monson, in Naperville, Illinois. He is the current chairman of the DCBA Real Estate Law committee. He concentrates in the practice of land use and development, estate planning – administration, corporate and real estate law. Mr. Monson received his Bachelor of Science degree and Master’s Degree in Business Administration from Northern Illinois University and his JD from DePaul University College of Law.

Greg Jones is completing his fourth year in in the evening division of Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he is a member of the law review editorial staff. Over the last six years Greg has worked full time as a city planner for numerous municipalities in the Chicagoland area. He is currently a member of the American Institute of Certified Planners.

 
 
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