The Journal of The DuPage County Bar Association

Back Issues > Vol. 20 (2007-08)

Criminal Background Checks of Prospective Jurors: A Necessity or an Intrusion? 
by Penelope Pillsbury Campbell

On October 25, 2007, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing en banc filed by former Governor George Ryan in United States v. Warner, et al., 2007 WL 3101807 (7th Cir. 2007).1 Justices Posner, Kanne and Williams dissented from the decision, identifying a number of reasons they believed the case should have been revisited.2 One of those reasons was well known to the public at the time because the news media uncovered the criminal histories of the impanelled jurors and, after the first story was published, two jurors were excused mid-way through deliberations:

"A reporter for the Chicago Tribune advised the district court during deliberations that the newspaper’s research had disclosed major inconsistencies between answers in a jury questionnaire and public records."3

Ryan is thus another high-profile case, among many involving political figures, suspected terrorists, or other prominent defendants, which have raised the issue of the propriety and wisdom of allowing counsel or the court to examine potential jurors’ criminal backgrounds during the voir dire process.4 While the issue remains largely unexplored by legal scholars and most courts, it has been analyzed by a handful of jurisdictions, including Iowa, Alaska, Missouri, Indiana, New Hampshire and the Second and Seventh Circuits. As one might expect, the views of both prosecutors and defendants regarding access to prospective jurors’ criminal records are driven by their respective positions. Review and analysis of the course the issue has taken thus far through both the state and federal court systems, and examination of the issue from a statutory perspective, leads to the conclusion that criminal background checks of prospective jurors are necessary to assure juror impartiality and should be the governing procedure in state and federal courts in Illinois.


Fundamental questions of fairness and public policy are raised by the question whether to permit or deny access to the criminal backgrounds of potential jurors. While "[o]ne touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact," many courts that have addressed the issue of prosecutorial access to criminal backgrounds of jurors have noted that it is not only a criminal defendant who deserves a fair trial, but the government as well.5 Voir dire is designed to help protect the right to a fair trial for both the defense and prosecution by exposing biases against either side.6 To detect biases that would give rise to a challenge for cause, many jurisdictions rely solely on the veracity of jurors’ answers during voir dire. Some jurisdictions, however, have attempted to ensure the accuracy of the answers to voir dire questions regarding a criminal background by verifying those answers using criminal records of jurors.7

While prosecutorial access to such records has been largely upheld by courts, challenges to the practice have focused primarily on three fundamental arguments:8 Defendants commonly contend, first, that access is precluded by state statutes governing both the dissemination of information contained in criminal records and the prescribed duties of prosecutors;9 second, that prosecutorial access to jurors’ criminal histories denies defendants due process of law; and third, that prosecutorial use of this information during voir dire violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.10

A juror’s personal encounters with the criminal justice system are of particular import to the prosecution as representatives of the government.11 Such encounters, even if they do not lead to criminal conviction, are generally considered by prosecutors to have a tendency to induce anti-government bias. The risk of bias is particularly great if the crime for which a juror (or a family member) was arrested is similar to the crime with which the defendant is charged. Thus, prosecutors desire access to prospective juror’s criminal records as a means of uncovering anti-government biases.

A criminal defendant, on the other hand, is generally opposed to prosecutorial access to prospective juror’s criminal records for the following reasons:12 first, unilateral access affords an unfair advantage to a prosecutor;13 second, access to and use of prospective juror’s criminal records exceeds the scope of a prosecutor’s duties and violates state statutes governing the purposes for which criminal records may be used;14 and third, criminal defendants argue that these records are unnecessarily cumulative as jurors often provide answers regarding their criminal histories on voir dire questionnaires.15

In response, prosecutors deny that access to a juror’s criminal history provides an unfair advantage to the government, and assert that it merely levels the playing field because encounters with the criminal justice system tend to induce bias only against the government, and may indeed foster sympathy for a defendant, thereby benefiting him.16 Moreover, whether the information on criminal records is unnecessarily duplicative is the crux of the issue. A prosecutor is likely to view this information not as unnecessarily cumulative, but rather as a critical check on a juror’s candor and reliability. Courts have proved themselves likely to agree, though each has resolved the issues surrounding the grant of access differently.17


The Supreme Court of Iowa was the first state supreme court to tackle this issue when it did so in 1987.18 In State v. Bessenecker, the defendant attempted to reverse his conviction for second-degree theft on the ground that the prosecutor’s use of jurors’ criminal history data was improper,19 and, more specifically, that the use of such data violated the statutorily prescribed duties of a prosecutor.20 The statute in question detailed eighty-five duties of a county attorney, none of which specified or required that a county attorney investigate jurors’ criminal histories.21 The statute did, however, require a county attorney to enforce and prosecute violations of the law in the name of the state. 22

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that investigation of prospective jurors, which allows challenges to be utilized intelligently, is merely a facet of the implied duty to prosecute competently.23 Thus, voir dire, the court held, is essentially an administrative duty and does not fall within the expressly prescribed duties of a county attorney. Moreover, when viewed in conjunction with the state statute which governs the dissemination of criminal history data, the tone of which creates a "wall of legislative protection" around such data, an examination precludes access to the records.24

The Bessenecker court did, however, suggest that an exception to this general rule of inaccessibility might be available, on a case-by-case basis,25 upon a showing of reasonable basis to believe that the criminal history contains information warranting disqualification, and which the voir dire questionnaire is unlikely to disclose.26 However, the court also stated that if a county attorney utilizes the criminal history data, he must share the information with the defendant.27

The holding of the Iowa Supreme Court has been largely rejected.28 Given much the same argument for a mistrial by a defendant, the Alaska Court of Appeals in 1991 reached the opposite result in Tagala v. State.29 The defendant-appellant appealed from a conviction for murder on the grounds, among others, that it was error to deny a motion for mistrial that was based on an investigation by the prosecution into the criminal background of twenty-six prospective jurors."30 Citing Bessenecker, the defendant contended that such information could not be obtained or used lawfully without a court order.31 The conviction was affirmed because the relevant statute granted access to those using the information for "law enforcement purposes," because prosecution is a "law enforcement purpose," and because prosecution involves, among other duties, challenging prospective jurors for cause.32 Thus, while Alaska prosecutors may obtain access to the criminal records of prospective jurors, the court noted that where a prosecutor intends to rely on such information, he must, upon request by the defense, disclose the records to the defense.33

The Missouri Court of Appeals reached a virtually identical conclusion regarding prosecutorial access to prospective juror’s criminal records that same year.34 In State v. McMahan, a conviction for felony theft was appealed on the grounds, among others, that a juror had been excluded on motion of the State. (The individual had, in fact, been arrested but had denied it during voir dire.) The imaginative defense contended both that the juror had been unlawfully deprived of a right to serve on a jury, and that the defendant had standing to complain of the violation of that right. The defendant also contended that access to the information had provided an unfair advantage to the prosecution. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting that a Missouri statute expressly provides access to arrest records to ". . . courts, . . . law enforcement agencies, and federal agencies for purposes of prosecution, litigation . . . ."35 Thus, the court held that while standing of the defendant to assert the rights of a potential juror was "doubtful," and that any prejudice to the defendant from a violation of this statute was merely "speculative", the issue was moot as no violation of the statute occurred.36

Most recently, the Court of Appeals of Virginia has reinforced this perspective.37 In Salmon v. Commonwealth, Salmon, appealing from a conviction for larceny, asserted that under Virginia statute, which allows criminal histories to be disseminated to "[a]uthorized officers or employees of criminal justice agencies, as defined by §9-169 . . .," prosecutorial access is precluded.38 The conviction, however, was affirmed, as §9-169 defines a "criminal justice agency" as any "governmental agency . . . which . . . performs the administration of criminal justice."39 The "administration of criminal justice," in turn, is defined as the "performance of any activity directly involving the . . . prosecution . . . of accused persons or criminal offenders."40 Thus, the court deemed the defendant-appellant’s argument meritless, noting that prosecution begins when a formal accusation is made and encapsulates the entire process by which an accused is brought to justice.41 The defendant-appellant also advanced arguments about unfairness: first, that access positioned the prosecution to gain unfair advantage via knowledge of a prospective juror’s background without the attendant risk of hostility by inquiring during voir dire; and second, that access positioned the prosecution to "screen out" prospects who might sympathize with the defendant due to their own arrests or indictments. These arguments were rejected as "equivocal and speculative."42

In 1997, the Supreme Court of Indiana became the second state supreme court to address the issue of prosecutorial access to prospective jurors’ criminal records during the voir dire process.43 In Saylor v. State, a criminal defendant contended that he was entitled to a new trial because such access disadvantaged him and denied him due process of law.44 The defendant’s conviction was affirmed because he failed to show that the State’s use of the jurors’ criminal records disadvantaged him as no jurors were challenged due to their criminal histories.45 More importantly, the court rejected the defendant’s assertion that he was denied due process of law because the trial court had expressly stated that it would review a discovery request for the information, thereby mitigating any prosecutorial advantage.46

Two years later, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed the issue of whether prosecutorial access to criminal records violates a defendant’s due process, reaching the opposite conclusion.47 In State v. Goodale, the court, noting that a defendant’s right to due process of law requires that the entire process be fundamentally fair, affirmed a conviction for assault on the ground that because the jury was, in fact, impartial, despite defendant’s ability to demonstrate that the prosecutor had access to records that the defendant did not, violation of defendant’s due process right was irrelevant.48

In the same opinion, the Goodale court also addressed whether a defendant’s lack of access to prospective jurors’ criminal records where the prosecutor has access is violative of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.49 The court held that if a prosecutor’s access to and use of criminal histories of prospective jurors, and a defendant’s lack of access to such information, results in a partial jury by which the defendant is harmed, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated.50 The burden rests upon the defendant to show that the jury was prejudiced.51



While the Goodale court held that a defendant’s rights would be violated were he able to demonstrate that as a result of the access imbalance the jury lacked impartiality, Goodale failed to offer, and the court therefore found, no evidence of partiality.52 Thus, the court held, Goodale’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated. The Bessenecker court, then, remains the lone dissenter in what has otherwise proved to be a chorus of affirmation for prosecutorial access to prospective jurors’ criminal records. Though the Bessenecker court did provide for an exception to this lack of access if a prosecutor had reason to believe that the juror had an otherwise undisclosed encounter with the criminal justice system,53 even this narrow exception is flawed. The court fails to address the means by which, without access to a prospective juror’s criminal record, a prosecutor might have credible reason to believe the juror has a criminal background he has failed to disclose, for it is unlikely that the court would grant access based on a mere hunch or even hearsay.


The issue of prosecutorial access to prospective jurors’ criminal backgrounds has also arisen in the federal court system.54 In an early and little noted opinion, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of criminal background checks of jurors as possibly violative of the Sixth Amendment.55 In United States v. Flange, the court curtly brushed aside a Sixth Amendment challenge to the prosecution’s use of criminal background information in jury selection concluding that use of such information did not result "in a jury specially conditioned to convict or otherwise biased or prejudiced against the defendant."56 The court also dismissed the argument that authorization to conduct criminal background checks of jurors would discourage citizens from serving as jurors as mere "far fetched bogies."57

While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, the Court held that the failure of a juror to correctly answer a question during voir dire does not entitle a defendant to a new trial unless the juror’s failure to disclose denied defendant his right to an impartial jury.58 Further, the Court developed a dual-pronged test to determine whether a juror’s incorrect answer entitles a defendant to a new trial. First, the defendant must show "that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire," and second, he must "show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause."59

In United States v. Warner, Judge Pallmeyer of the Northern District of Illinois relied upon McDonough heavily.60 In that case, prospective jurors were required to complete a questionnaire containing 110 questions, one group of which inquired whether the juror or any member of his or her family had been involved in prior criminal proceedings, had been charged with or accused of a crime, or had been involved in any court proceeding.61 Subsequent to submission of the case to the jury, the court, via the news media, discovered that a number of impanelled jurors had failed to disclose encounters with the criminal justice system on their questionnaires. Judge Pallmeyer thus ordered background checks of the jurors in question.62

The background checks revealed that some jurors had, perhaps unknowingly, listed incorrect information regarding their own criminal histories, and two jurors had knowingly lied during voir dire.63 One juror, juror Ezell, had lied about lying to the government, precisely the charge against Ryan.64 The prosecution argued that the information revealed by these background checks indicated that the jurors who had knowingly lied were biased against the government.65 The prosecution also noted that it certainly would have challenged Ezell for cause had it known that she had an arrest under an alias because "[h]ow somebody who gives law enforcement officers false information upon an arrest can possibly be an impartial juror in this case, where one of the charges is giving false information to law enforcement officers" was beyond the realm of the prosecution’s understanding.66 That is, had Ezell answered her questionnaire truthfully, her answers would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.

In evaluating this claim, Judge Pallmeyer turned to the McDonough test.67 The Court held that most of the jurors did not answer "dishonestly," and that even had they done so, a "correct answer" would not have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.68 The Court agreed however, that the two jurors and one alternate who knowingly lied were properly disqualified under the McDonough standard. 69 The Court, sua sponte, dismissed a third juror for a medical condition.70

As a result, Ryan requested a new trial arguing, inter alia, that removal of the two jurors prejudiced the remaining jurors against the defense.71 Ryan’s reasoning was that because a number of the remaining jurors had lied on their questionnaires, albeit unknowingly or harmlessly, and were offered prosecutorial immunity, those jurors would be predisposed to a verdict for the government so as not to incent the government to reconsider its decision and subject the jurors to felony charges.72 Judge Pallmeyer denied the motion, and Ryan appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit first established that Judge Pallmeyer applied the appropriate standard, the McDonough standard, and that she applied it consistently to each juror.73 The remainder of the issues examined by the Seventh Circuit with respect to juror removal were whether Ezell was dismissed simply because she was the lone holdout for the defense, which the Court rejected because Ezell was not the only juror dismissed; whether the removal of Ezell chilled the expression of other potential pro-defense jurors, which the Court rejected because the court issued new instructions to the reconstituted jury; and whether, as discussed above, the background checks prejudiced the defense.74 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.75 Ryan then petitioned for en banc reconsideration of the panel decision.76

While the full panel voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, Judges Posner, Kanne and Williams filed a vociferous dissent from the denial of rehearing.77 The focus of the dissent, with respect to the voir dire issues raised by the defense, was the question whether because the jurors who remained "faced potential prosecution by a party to the case," those jurors were prejudiced in favor of the government so as to diminish the likelihood of their own prosecution.78 Judge Posner, in his dissent, reached the conclusion that the "government’s attempt to immunize jurors itself suggests that the proceedings were broken beyond repair."79

The lesson is unmistakable. The Ryan case was expensively protracted because the prosecution failed to undertake pre-impanelling criminal background checks. Had they done so, all of the ensuing contretemps could have been avoided. Again, while the precise issue of the propriety of background checks is not expressly discussed in any of the Ryan decisions, it is central to the analysis in each of the decisions.80 Further, the Courts’ view of the propriety of criminal background checks may be inferred from the analysis contained in both Judge Pallmeyer’s and Judge Posner’s opinions.


Both the McDonough Court, in developing the test, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in relying upon the test to reach a decision, necessarily imply that parties should have a means of detecting whether a "juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire." With respect to questions concerning a juror’s encounters with the criminal justice system, the only way to reliably test the accuracy of an answer during voir dire is to consult the government’s records containing the information.

Interestingly, two federal judges have subsequently addressed this issue with differing results.81 In United States v. Sorich, et. al., Judge Coar ordered that there be " . . . no public record search, computer background checks or criminal background checks of any juror in this case."82 According to Coar, "I’ve not heard the case made in this case why criminal background checks should be run."83 More recently, however, Judge St. Eve issued a decision which stated, in part, that "[t]he Probation Department and Pretrial Services are ordered to conduct criminal background checks . . . and provide the results of such checks to the Court in advance of trial."84 Thus, in requiring that the government check the records and provide them to the court as opposed to counsel, St. Eve appears to provide a novel solution to the issue.


The statutes that govern which members of the public may serve on juries also prove instructive on the question of prosecutorial access to prospective jurors’ criminal backgrounds. Both 28 U.S.C. §1865 and 705 ILCS 305/2 set forth basic criteria regarding which members of society may or may not be considered for jury service. 28 U.S.C. §1865 designates five categories of people who may not serve on a federal jury. The last of the five criteria, any one of which is sufficient to disqualify a potential juror, disqualifies a person who "has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored."

Thus, Congress has unequivocally expressed the view that the justice system is best served by disqualifying felons from determining whether others have committed crimes. The importance Congress places on this criterion compels the conclusion that verification of potential jurors’ criminal histories is crucial to the implementation of Congressional intent and to the fulfillment of the Constitutional objective of impartial and unbiased juries. Congress’ expressed intent should not be vulnerable to nullification by the dishonesty of a potential juror. The government’s approach to selecting jurors is certainly no less important, and therefore should not be materially different than, the government’s efforts to corroborate that the taxes collected from a taxpayer by the Internal Revenue Service, a portion of which allow the judicial system to function, is the proper amount by checking the taxpayer’s stated income against his W-2 form. The integrity of the jury system, which hinges on the right to a fair and impartial jury, should not be subject to the caprice of potential felons who may even choose to be dishonest in an effort to seek retribution against the government.

705 ILCS 305/2, on the other hand, establishes four criteria that Illinoisans must meet to sit on an Illinois jury. An examination of that which Illinois legislators believe to be the decisive factors that would qualify a member of the public for jury service reveals a similar intent. While the statute does not expressly prohibit felons or those convicted of any crime from serving on an Illinois jury, it does specify that "[j]urors must be: [f]ree from all legal exception, of fair character," and "of approved integrity . . .." A prospective juror’s inaccurate response during voir dire should not serve to negate legislative intent.


If confronted with the issue of prosecutorial access to a potential juror’s criminal records, an Illinois court would likely grant or affirm access. The court may also examine, for instance, 55 ILCS 5/3-9005, the Illinois statute prescribing the duties of a State’s Attorney, which reads, "[t]he duty of each State’s attorney shall be . . . [t]o commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may be concerned." It is likely that an Illinois court would hold that the duty "to commence and prosecute" includes the duty to conduct voir dire competently.

An Illinois court may also look to 20 ILCS 2635/1, the Illinois Uniform Conviction Information Act, an Illinois statute governing dissemination of conviction information maintained by the State of Illinois. Section five of the Act states that "[a]ll conviction information . . . maintained by the Department of State Police shall be open to public inspection in the State of Illinois. All persons, state agencies and units of local government shall have access to inspect, examine and reproduce such information . . .." A court would likely find that the language of the legislation indicates that the drafters believed that public access to this information generally outweighs an individual’s right to privacy.


Prosecutorial access to potential jurors’ criminal records during voir dire is supportive of the underlying premises of the jury system. While theoretically a prosecutor has the ability to obtain truthful answers regarding a specific juror’s encounters with the criminal justice system solely from voir dire, our society is not in the habit of allowing its citizens to mislead the government by accepting as gospel their answers regarding issues it deems critical to the functioning of our society. "The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious."85 Thus, prosecutors require the ability to verify prospective jurors’ answers on voir dire.

Generally, courts have granted access to criminal records because it places prosecutors and defendants on a more equal footing for purposes of jury selection, since, with rare exception, a juror with a criminal record is likely to be more sympathetic to a criminal defendant. Moreover, while from a policy perspective a defendant should not be allowed the same access to prospective jurors’ criminal records because it may afford him the opportunity to preemptively rehabilitate those he believes the prosecution will challenge for cause, such prohibition likely violates a defendant’s due process of law. Thus, as the policy reason is merely speculative, a defendant should have equal access to prospective jurors’ criminal records.

Additionally, Congress had deemed the issue important enough to the vitality of justice to legislate. The functioning of our society is partially premised on the assumption, and in fact demands, that we pay heed. The unverified responses of potential jurors to questions on voir dire should not have the ability to invalidate the intent of Congress.

Thus, the decisions of Judge Coar and the Bessenecker court notwithstanding, criminal records of prospective jurors are a vital tool in the arsenals of prosecutors to ensure that the ends of justice are properly served. "A trial represents an important investment of private and social resources, and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir dire examination."86 We have the ability to avoid the issue entirely by allowing prosecutors access to prospective jurors’ criminal records.

1 United States v. Ryan, et al., 2007 WL 3101807 (7th Cir. 2007)

2 Id at 2.

3 Id.

4 United States v. Sorich, 427 F.Supp.2d 820; United States v. Marzook, 2005 WL 3095543 (N.D.Ill.), slip op.

5 McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).

6 Id.

7 Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

8 Salmon v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 815, 818 (Va. App. 2000).

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 135 (Iowa 1987).

12 Id. at 136.

13 State v. Goodale, 740 A.2d 1026, 1029 (N.H. 1999).

14 State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Iowa 1987).

15 Id. at 137.

16 State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 135 (Iowa 1987).

17 Salmon v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 815, 818 (Va. App. 2000).

18 State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 1987).

19 Id. at 136.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 137.

25 Id. at 138.

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Salmon v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 815, 818 (Va. App. 2000).

29 Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 613.

34 State v. McMahan, 821 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Salmon v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 815, 819 (Va. App. 2000).

38 Id. at 818

39 Id.

40 Id.

41 Id. at 819.

42 Id.

43 Saylor v. State, 686 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. 1997).

44 Id. at 83.

45 Id.

46 Id.

47 State v. Goodale, 740 A.2d 1026, 1030 (N.H. 1999).

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 Id.

52 Id.

53 State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa 1987).

54 United States v. Warner, et al., 2006 WL 2583722 (N.D.Ill.), slip op. at 38.

55 United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1970).

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 549 (1984).

59 Id. at 556.

60 United States. v. Warner, et al., 2006 WL 2583722 (N.D.Ill.), slip op. at 38.

61 Id. at 37.

62 United States v. Warner, et al., 2007 WL 3101807 at * 2 (7th Cir. 2007).

63 United States v. Warner, et al., 498 F.3d 666, 685 (7th Cir. 2007)

64 Id.

65 Id.

66 Id.

67 United States. v. Warner, et al., 2006 WL 2583722 (N.D.Ill.), slip op. at 38.

68 Id.

69 Id. at 38.

70 United States v. Warner, et al., 498 F.3d 666, 684 (7th Cir. 2007).

71 Id.

72 United State v. Warner, et al., 2007 WL 3101807 at *2 (7th Cir. 2007).

73 United State v. Warner, et al., 498 F.3d 666, 684 (7th Cir. 2007).

74 Id. at 684 – 688.

75 Id. at 667.

76 United States v. Warner, et al., 2007 WL 3101807 at *2 (7th Cir. 2007).

77 Id.

78 Id. at 7.

79 Id.

80 Id.

81 United States v. Sorich, 427 F.Supp.2d 820; United States v. Marzook, et. al., 2005 WL 3095543 (N.D.Ill), slip op.

82 United States v. Sorich, 427 F.Supp.2d 820, order denying motion, April 26, 2006.

83 Rudolph Bush, Michael Higgins and Todd Lighty, Judge Bans Juror Checks, Chi. Trib., April 27, 2006.

84 United States v. Marzook, 2005 WL 3095543 (N.D.Ill.), slip op., order on motion, September 1, 2006.

85 McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).

86 Id. at 555 (1984).

Penelope Campbell is a 2001 graduate of Northwestern University and is a third year law student Loyola University School of Law in Chicago.  She lives in Streeterville and is currently employed as a press secretary.

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