In recent years we have heard repeated challenges to the use of "Christmas Tree Bills" by the Illinois Legislature. The press accounts about "truth-in-sentencing" and "safe neighborhoods" covered only major criminal topics. Minor challenges continue to be made, and the state tax practitioner should not forget about challenges to P.A. 85-1135 and P.A. 91-38 cited below.
The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, [is] one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the State. Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill.2d at 202, 311 N.E.2d 116.
Thus, one reason for the single subject rule is to prevent legislation from being passed which, standing alone, could not muster the necessary votes for passage. Geja’s Café v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill.2d 239,258, 606 N.E.2d 1212 (1992). The rule also serves to facilitate orderly legislative procedure. "By limiting each bill to a single subject, the issues presented by each bill can be better grasped and more intelligently discussed." [Citation omitted] Johnson v. Edgar 680 N.E.2d at 1379.
B. Held: Bill violated the "single-subject" rule of the Illinois Constitution because various provisions have no "natural and logical connection." Purpose of single-subject rule is two-fold: to prevent logrolling, but also to insure "an orderly legislative process."
C. The criminal components were re-enacted piecemeal over the intervening period of litigation.
1. Sex offender registration changes - P.A. 89-462, eff. 5-29-96;
2. Eavesdrop exemption - P.A. 89-452, eff. 5-17-96;
3. Cannabis penalties - P.A. 90-397, eff. 8-15-97;
4. Re-enactment of predatory criminal sexual assault – P.A. 89-462, eff. 5-29-96;
5. Vehicular hijacking – P.A. 89-462, eff. 5-29-96;
6. Parole review hearings changes - not re-enacted;
7. Fitness hearing requirement - P.A. 89-689, eff. 12-31-96;
8. Child Hearsay exemption - P.A. 90-656, eff. 7-30-98.
Note: HB 1698, P.A. 89-280, eff. 1-1-96 also addressed public hospital liens. P.A. 89-404’s criminal provisions were re-enacted in P.A. 90-592, eff. 6-19-98, and P.A. 90-593, eff. 6-19-98 and 1-1-99.
B. P.A. 89-404 began as a proposal to modify statutes relating to the insanity defense, but as passed contained ten sections:
1. Counties Code (restating a sheriff’s duty as "conservator of the peace").
2. Illinois Municipal Code (redefining local police officers’ duties).
3. Criminal Code (redefining the term "insanity" and enhancing the burden of proof for a defendant asserting the insanity defense).
4. Cannabis Control Act (changing the distribution of proceeds from the sale of certain drug forfeiture assets).
5. Illinois Controlled Substances Act (authorizing multiple convictions and sentences for violators, adding new sentencing guidelines and redirecting the distribution of proceeds from the sale of forfeiture assets).
6. Code of Criminal Procedure (defining the term "law enforcement agency" and increasing police officers’ authority to make arrests outside their primary jurisdictions).
7. Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (dropping the requirement that judicial in rem proceedings be conducted without a jury).
8. Unified Code of Corrections (providing for truth-in-sentencing [85% - 100% for specified offenses], creating the Illinois Truth-in-Sentencing Commission, redefining the term "insanity"; and modifying procedures regulating transfer or release petitions from defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity).
9. Code of Civil Procedure (providing that the homestead exemption is not available to property subject to certain drug asset forfeiture proceedings).
10. Hospital Lien Act (bringing hospitals operated by local governmental entities within the act and altering procedures for the perfection and satisfaction of liens).
C. The court ruled that the combination of these provisions in the same bill violated the single-subject rule because the act contained "as many as five separate legislative topics involving both civil and criminal matters" and "at least two unrelated subjects: matters relating to the criminal justice system, and matters relating to hospital liens."
1. The fact that all the provisions dealt with the responsibilities of State’s Attorneys was not sufficient to satisfy the single-subject rule. "To say that such a connection satisfies the single-subject rule strains credulity."
2. In addition, "that these topics might fit within the broad subject of governmental matters is not compelling. As we cautioned in Johnson [v. Edgar], the permitted use of such a sweeping and vague category to unite unrelated measures would render the single-subject clause of our constitution meaningless."
D. The court rejected the State’s arguments that the legislation should be upheld despite the single-subject rule violation. The court rejected the State’s proposed "waiver by codification" rule, which would preclude a single-subject rule challenge once an act has been codified.
1. Such a rule would conflict with "well-established single-subject clause jurisprudence," which treats such violations with "seriousness."
2. A "codification" rule would also "drastically diminish the effect and importance of the single-subject clause."
3. The time between passage of a bill and its codification is "frequently minute," making it difficult to raise challenges.
4. The rule would emphasize finality at the expense of enacting legislation via constitutional procedures.
A. In People v. Wooters, 188 Ill.2d 500, 722 N.E.2d 402 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court considered a bill which: 1) imposed a mandatory life sentence on conviction of first degree murder where defendant was over 17 and decedent was under 12; 2) changed bail appearance requirements for certain domestic offenses; 3) modified definitions of certain sex offenses with child (solicitation/accountability); 4) allowed restitution to domestic battery shelters; 5) made changes to DUI child passenger cases; and 6) modified mortgage foreclosure eviction provisions (P.A. 89-203) to protect unnamed owners. (P.A. 89-203)
B. Single-subject challenge upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Wooters.
C. Not yet re-enacted.
V. P.A. 88-680 - Safe Neighborhoods Law, eff. 1-1-95.
A. In People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80, 723 N.E.2d 265 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the "Safe Neighborhoods Law," P.A. 88-680, violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. SB 1353 began as a bill mandating public service hours for specified misdemeanors when incarceration was not imposed. The House added as an amendment Mayor Daley’s "Safe Neighborhood Law." The amended version of the bill, upon rejection by the Senate, was further modified in a Conference Committee to include the following subjects:
1. Article 5 amended the Juvenile Court Act to provide for a "presumptive transfer" hearing for a minor 15 years of age or older charged with a Class X felony [armed violence offenses restricted]. 705 ILCS 405/5-4.
It also expanded the time frames within which certain offenses needed to be adjudicated, and extended the duration of wardship to age 21 for certain offenses. 705 ILCS 405/5-14 and 5-34.
2. Article 15 upped the maximum penalty for intimidation, and expanded the class of persons threatened under the Communicating With a Juror/Witness statute and the Harassment of Juror/Witness statute. 720 ILCS 5/12-6, 5/32-4, 5/32-4a.
It also added gang leadership as a sentencing aggravating factor for felony offenses committed by two or more persons. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2.
It also mandated community service, where available, when the offense was gang-related.
730 ILCS 5/5-6-3, 5/5-6-3.1.
3. Article 20 expanded mandatory jail/community service provisions of ?6-303 (7 days) or ?11-501 (30 days) sentences to include a statutory summary suspension predicate; two days mandatory jail for second DUI within 5 years. Maximum penalty for Aggravated DUI increased to 1-12 years. 625 ILCS 5/6-303, 5/11-501.
A NEW CHALLENGE RELATED TO PUBLIC ACT 88-680
P.A. 90-738 amended the crime of "aggravated" DUI, based on committing a DUI while on summary suspension by adding certain felony predicate revocations [‘9-3, ’11-401(b)] for this crime. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(c-1). However, this P.A. 90-738, at least as it concerns DUI, merely amended that portion of 88-680 that created this section of the DUI statute in the first place. Sec. 5/11-501(c-1). Consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Tellez-Valencia, 188 Ill.2d 523, 723 N.E.2d 223 (1999), affirming the Appellate Court’s holding that the amendment of a void statute does not reenact the statute, any felony sentence for DUI based on the commission of a DUI while revoked for 9-3 or 11-401(b), under section 5/11-501(c-1), may be invalid.
Please note that 90-738 also created two brand-new sub-sections to 5/11-501(c), specifically subsections (c-2) and (c-3) [Class 3, 2 DUI’s]. Because these subsections did not amend the language that was added to the DUI statute by 88-680, it does not appear that these sections share the Tellez-Valencia problem.
4. Article 25 amended the Cannabis Control Act and the Controlled Substances Act’s special probation statutes to mandate a minimum 24-month probation period with mandated community service and drug testing, and allowed for "discharge and dismissal" thereunder as a sentencing aggravating factor within five years for a subsequent offense. 720 ILCS 550/10, 570/410.
5. Article 30 created the offense of gun-running, upped the penalty to Class 2 for firearm ID mark alteration, and authorized surrender of firearms as a condition of bail. Upgraded violation of bail bond offense penalty when gun possessed. 720 ILCS 5/24-3A new, 5/24-5, 5/32-10; 725 ILCS 5/110-10.
6. Article 35 increased the penalties for attempt murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, etc. when a police officer or other specified victim was had. 720 ILCS 5/8-4, 5/12-4.2, 5/24-1.2.
It also expanded crime victims’ rights protections to all violent delinquent crime victims. 725 ILCS 120/4.5, 120/6; 730 ILCS 5/3-10-13.
7. Article 40 upped the penalties for compelling organization membership. 720 ILCS 5/12-6.1.
8. Article 45 expanded the detention period for minors 10 to 13 years of age committed to DCFS, and authorized transfer to DOC [or their contractee]. 705 ILS 405/5-23; 730 ILCS 5/3-10-11.
9. Article 50 expanded the Women’s Infant’s and Children’s [WIC] Vendor Management Act administrative authority to any person [formerly only vendors]. 410 ILCS 255/6.
It also amended the Firearms Owners Identification Card Act to provide different penalties for unlawful firearms and ammunition violations. 430 ILCS 65/2, 65/14.
It further restricted the granting of supervision for certain delinquency offenses. 205 ILCS 405/5-19.
It also expanded the "consideration" element of prostitution-type offenses to other than money. 720 ILCS 5/11-14, 11-14.1, 11-16, 11-19, 11-19.1, 11-19.2.
It also expanded child pornography prosecution to computer depictions. 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1.
10. Article 17B created the offense of WIC Fraud. 720 ILCS 5/17B-1 et. seq. It also upgraded UUW(a)(4) and (10) offenses to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.
It also upgraded offense levels for Unlawful Sale or Possession of Firearms. 720 ILCS 5/24-3, 5/24-3.1.
It also upgraded the penalties for certain classes of Armed Violence [minimum 15]. 720 ILCS 5/33-A-1 et. seq.
It also upgraded the offense level for a custodian permitting child abuse. 720 ILCS 150/5.1.
It also amended the Code of Corrections to mandate DOC for certain FOID sale violations. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.
B. A unanimous Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Cervantes, op. cit., upheld the constitutional challenge, criticizing the inclusion of WIC administrative changes and DOC/DCFS child care licensing provisions in an otherwise criminal bill.
C. Note: Two parts were reenacted in 1999: WIC Fraud in SB 731 [P.A. 91-0155, eff. 7-16-99] and a Child Pornography amendment in SB 732 [P.A. 91-0054, eff. 6-30-99].
D. Other provisions were re-enacted in 2000; one was defeated and one was not called for a vote in the House.
i. SB 1358 Summary: Private youth prisons.
Status: Defeated in Senate 22-37.
ii. SB 1359 Summary: WIC Vendor Management.
Status: P.A. 91-0691, eff. 4-13-00.
iii. SB 1360 Re-enacts presumptive juvenile transfer provision.
Status: Passed Senate; not called for House vote.
iv. SB 1361 Re-enacts multiple drug conviction and IVC provisions.
Status: P.A. 91-0692, eff. 4-13-00.
v. SB 1362 Re-enacts the victim/witness notice requirements in juvenile delinquency cases.
Status: P.A. 91-0693, eff. 4-13-00.
vi. SB 1363 Re-enacts the FOID chard changes.
Status: P.A. 91-0694, eff. 4-13-00.
vii. SB 1364 Re-enacts the escape (PTR warrant) and escape-notice provisions.
Status: P.A. 91-0695, eff. 4-13-00.
viii. SB 1365 Re-enacts amendments to gang intimidation; gun-running;
mandatory bail court appearance for certain offenses; attempt murder penalty enhancements; creates offense of permitting sex offense; expands article of value for prostitution-related offenses; unlawful gun sale provision; and armed violence penalty of 15 years re-enacted [moot given P.A. 91-404, eff. 1-1-2000].
Status: P.A. 91-0696, eff. 4-13-00.
ix. HB 739 Summary: UUW amendment
(720 ILCS 5/24-1)
1) a4 and a10 violations not applicable when the weapon is broken down, or not immediately accessible, or unloaded and encased if one has a FOID card [note: out-of-state hunters protected by the exemption in 24-2(b)(3).]
2) a8 violations [tavern, non-exempt public gathering] upped to a Class 4 felony.
3) Creates offense of aggravated unlawful use of weapon (Class 4/ 2d offense Class 2); requires an a4 or an a10 violation plus:
a. Firearm uncased,1 loaded, and immediately accessible; or
b. Firearm uncased, unloaded, but ammo immediately accessible; or
c. No FOID card; or
d. Prior juvenile adjudication for a felony; or
e. Possessor engaged in misdemeanor drug or cannabis offense; or
f. Possessor a street gang member2 or engaged in street gang activity; or
g. Defendant has OOP issued against him within 2 years; or
h. Possessor engaged [attempts included] in a violent misdemeanor [threat to person or property]; or
i. Possessor is under 21 with a handgun unless exempted (target club, hunting, etc.).
4) UUW by a felon nets a Class 2 felony.
Status: P.A. 91-0690, eff. 4-13-00.
VI. P.A. 85-1135, eff. July 28, 1988; Sept. 1, 1988; Jan. 1, 1990 - Home Rule Sales Taxes
A sales tax amendment authorizing only home rule units to impose inter alia a retailer’s occupation tax, was held unconstitutionally passed in Oak Park Arms v. Douglas Whitley, 92 L 51045 [Cook County/Judge Lanigan] in August 1998. The bill also made changes to the Environmental Protection Act to encourage water treatment works construction through state grants and loans [subject to assurance of repayment by user fees, etc.], and authorized an increase of state debt to fund state capital projects. Status: Petition for Leave to Appeal recalled due to post-hearing action [No. 86117].
Also see Arangold Corp. V. Zehnder (1999) 187 Ill.2d 341, 718 N.E.2d 191 which upheld a budget implementation bill that addressed various funds.
1999’s new liquor tax increase is the subject of a challenge in Wexler v. Wirtz, et al, 00 L 00765 [Cook County, Judge Alexander White]. The bill amended the School Infrastructure Fund and School Maintenance Project Statute, created a Fund for Illinois’ Future, and increased taxes on alcoholic beverages. Status: Preliminary Injunction order granted May 30, 2000. A class action certification request was granted only to one liquor distributor.
A. Johnson v. Edgar held that certain civil provisions of P.A. 89-428 were "validated" by the passage of subsequent legislation, in separate bills, on the same subjects. However, the court did not suggest that the "validation" theory could be applied to the criminal provisions of P.A. 89-428. Ex post facto constitutional protections could prevent the above. U.S. Const. Amend. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, Art. I, sec. 10.
B. There is no question that the General Assembly can pass civil legislation "curing" a single-subject rule violation, so long as vested rights are not affected. See Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). However, the question is whether amending a statute that later turns out to be void is the same as repassing the entire act with the intent of curing a constitutional defect.
1. Legislative enactments which amend an existing law without changing its wording "are to be regarded as a continuation of the old law and not the enactment of a new law on that subject." Svenson v. Hanson, 289 Ill. 242, 124 N.E. 645 (1919); People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922); People v. Bullard, 61 Ill.2d 277, 335 N.E.2d 465 (1975). Also see People v. Reedy above.
2. Also see Statute on Statutes – "The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of such prior provisions, and not as a new enactment." 5 ILCS 70/2 (West 1996)).
3. Considerations in amended statute-type cases:
a. P.A. 89-462, eff. 5-29-96, did not reenact the whole truth-in-sentencing scheme, but merely added the newly-created offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child to the list of offenses subject to truth-in-sentencing; the entire language of the section was restated because of Art. IV, ?8 of Illinois Constitution ("A bill expressly amending a law shall set forth completely the sections amended").
b. The act contains no express validating language, as People v. Tellez-Valencia (below) would require.
c. The legislative debates for P.A. 89-462 do not suggest that the legislature intended to reenact the unconstitutional "truth-in-sentencing" scheme. The debates indicate that the legislature was attempting to reenact the criminal provisions previously held unconstitutional in Johnson v. Edgar, one of which was to add predatory criminal sexual assault to the already-existing "truth-in-sentencing" act.
i. One can argue that the rules concerning "curative" legislation are inapplicable where the legislature did not designate the entire statute as new language, as was done in P.A. 90-592, which was clearly intended to reenact the "truth-in-sentencing" provisions. To hold otherwise would allow a constitutional defect to be cured merely by passing an amendment to the unconstitutional legislation, instead of considering whether the concept should be a part of Illinois law, a purpose of the "single subject" rule.
4. Other relevant cases:
a. People v. Moore, 295 Ill.App.3d 676, 694 N.E.2d 184 (4th Dist. 1998) held: Where P.A. 89-428 created new criminal substantive criminal offense, subsequent "curative legislation" reenacting new offense and "truth-in-sentencing" will not be given retroactive effect, however Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault of a Child could be renamed on mittimus.
b. People v. Tellez-Valencia, 295 Ill.App.3d 122, 692 N.E.2d 407 (2d Dist. 1998) also held: "Curative legislation" must contain express "validating" language; in addition, defendant had vested right not to be charged with criminal offense that did not exist at the time of his acts. Conviction of Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault of a Child reversed, renaming offense on the mittimus was improper. After consolidating the two cases, the Supreme Court agreed with the 2d District in 1999 at 188 Ill.2d 523, 723 N.E.2d 223.
5. Civil "vested right":
No vested right in treble damages in nursing home lawsuits (when incident occurred) for a civil plaintiff. The second district court said it was axiomatic that no party has a vested right in a statutory penalty. "The claim of a vested right is most clearly untenable where the remedy eliminated is a statutory penalty that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the plaintiff,": said the court. White v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 295 Ill.App.3d 296, 692 N.E.2d 1363 (2d Dist. 1998). The Court said it must apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal — and doing so would not affect a vested right. Also see Ditsworth v. Kankakee Terrace Partnership, 298 Ill.App.2d 544, 699 N.E.2d 200 (PLA denied).
VIII. P.A. 89-689, (eff. Dec. 31, 1996) - Psychotropic Drugs — pending challenge
P.A. 89-689 is "an act in relation to public safety," and includes:
1. Amendments to 720 ILCS 5/31-6(c)(5) and (6), 5/31-7(f-5) and (6) - escape by violator of probation, conditional discharge, etc;
2. Amendment to 730 ILCS 5/3-4-3 regarding disposition of unclaimed IDOC commissary money;
3. Creation of offenses regarding abuse of guide dogs, 510 ILCS 70/7-15;
4. Extended term aggravating factor added for UUW by a gang member, 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(9);
5. IVC amendment to immunize medical personnel who do blood-urine collection upon the request of a police officer, from civil liability, absent "willful or wanton behavior." 625 ILCS 5/11-500.1;
6. Amendment to Counties Code regarding county juvenile "impact incarceration" programs. 55 ILCS 5/3-6039;
7. Amends the Juvenile Court Act to extend authorized period of detention when a condition of probation. 705 ILCS 405/5-23;
8. 20 ILCS 2630/5 amended to bar expungement of DUI supervision records;
9. 725 ILCS 5/104-21 amended to eliminate mandatory fitness evaluation upon receipt of psychotropic drugs;
10. OSAD required to do competitive bidding for panel attorneys. 725 ILCS 105/10.5;
11. Parole review period for indeterminate sentences expanded. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f);
12. Restitution mandated in all cases. 730 ILCS 5-5-6;
13) Creation of hearsay exception for immunized witnesses, upon refusal to testify. 725 ILCS 115-10.2;
13. Hate crime "covered persons" expanded to include associates of homosexuals, etc. 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1. Aggravating sentencing factor likewise amended; 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2;
14. Solicitation of murder penalty increased when solicited person is a minor. 720 ILCS 5/8-1.1;
15. DOC mandated to track gang membership of inmates. 730 ILCS 5/3-2-2. Unprivileged conversations of gang members can be monitored. 730 ILCS 5/3-2-2(t);
16. Truth-in-sentencing commission report delayed. 730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(f); and
17. DOC mandated to bar use of cell coverings. 730 ILCS 5/3-7-2(h).
Challenge rebuffed in People v. Majors (4th Dist. 1999) 308 Ill.App.3d 1021, 721 N.E.2d 753 (PLA denied); People v. Dixon (4th D. 1999) 308 Ill.App.3d 1008, 721 N.E.2d 1172; and People v. Startz, ____ Ill.App.3d ____, ____ N.E.2d ____ (No. 3-99-0068, 0075, and 0298, of 4-20-00).
IX. P.A. 89-8 upheld in People v. Malchow, 306 Ill.App.3d 665, 714 N.E.2d 583 (2d Dist. 1999); PLA granted in No. 88228.
In People v. Malchow, 306 Ill.App.3d 665, 714 N.E.2d 583 (2d Dist. 1999), the Illinois Appellate Court upheld P.A. 89-8 [multi effective dates in 1995], ruling that all the elements related to the criminal justice system. Specifically, P.A. 89-8 included:
1. 625 ILCS 5/6-303(c) eliminated the following language from the mandatory 7 day/30 days community service provision . . . "or restricted under the authority of a restricted driving permit or judicial driving permit . . ."
2. See 5/11-501, same change as above. ’11-501.1 violation added to [C-1]. [C-2]=s 48-hour consecutive language deleted. Similar change to 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(4.1).
3. Technical amendments to the Juvenile Court Act’s mandatory community service provision in 705 ILCS 405/5-19(9) and 5/23(b)(9).
4. Statute of limitation expanded for three offenses - concealment of a homicidal death and aggravated arson [both no time limit], and attempt first degree murder (7 years). 720 ILCS 5/3-5. [*eff. date may be 7-1-95]
5. Technical amendments to the mandatory community service provision of the following statutes: assault, criminal damage, weapons offenses, mob action, disorderly conduct — 720 ILCS 5/12-1, 5/21-1, 5/24-7, 5/25-1, 5/26-1.
6. The crime of compelling organization membership will also include deterring a person from leaving the organization. 720 ILCS 5/12-6.1.
7. If a victim requests, the state’s attorney must explain in nontechnical language what an adjudication of a juvenile as a delinquent for a violent crime means (previously just certain sex offenses). 725 ILCS 120/4.5(c)(3)
8. DOC "notification of escape" statute amended 730 ILCS 5/3-14.1.
9. Exempts from the Medical Practice Act activities associated with an execution. 225 ILCS 60/4, 725 ILCS 5/119-5.
10. Authority of statewide grand jury expanded to include the offense of gun running. 725 ILCS 215/2, 215/3.
11. IDOC must notify SA of committing county of inmate’s civil settlement in excess of $500 with IDOC, so to notify victim of right to civil suit.
12. Juvenile Court Act amended to allow (now mandatory) a restraining order vis-a-vis witness(es) or victim(s) 705 ILCS 405/5-10.5. Duration of wardship for "violent juvenile offenders" extended to age 21. 705 ILCS 405/5-34.
13. Interstate Agreement on Sexually Dangerous Persons Act amended to mandate compliance with registration and blood specimen requirements. 45 ILCS 20/2 [eff. 7-1-95?]
14. Sex Offender Registration Act amended to expand list of qualifying offenses. 730 ILCS 150/2. Yearly re-registration of sex offenders required 730 ILCS 150/6. Registration expanded to juvenile offenders 730 ILCS 150/7. Mandatory 7 days jail for violation of registration act; supervision disposition barred. Second offense a class 4 felony. Severability cause 150/10.9 (eff. 7-1-95].
15. Expands indecent solicitation of a child to include arranging a sex act with a child through a third party. 720 ILCS 5/11-6
16. Effective dates. Article 1, 5, and 25 eff. 3-21-95. Article 10 eff. 7-1-95.[Note amendments to 720 ILCS 5/3-5 in Article I may have an effective date of 7-1-95.]
X. P.A. 90-456 (eff. 1-1-98) held unconstitutional by a trial court in DeKalb County, pending in the Supreme Court as People v. Sypien, No. 89265.
Subjects covered include enhancing some disorderly conduct offenses to Class 4 felonies, specifying a false 911 call as disorderly conduct, enacting new "no knock" warrant provision, and amending the Juvenile Court Act as to when abuse hearings must be heard.
In the recent legislative session concluded April 15, 2000, two House resolutions were introduced to eliminate or restrict the constitutional impact of a single-subject violation [HJRCA 20 and 21]. Neither was called out of the House Rules Committee.
1 "Case" is defined in 520 ILCS 5/1.2b-1.
2 Subject to challenge, see Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 117 L.Ed.2d 309, 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992).
Stephen W. Baker . received his Undergraduate Degree from Western Illinois University and his Law Degree from Loyola University. Since 1987, he has been a Public Defender with the DuPage County Public Defender’s Office, Wheaton, IL.
(The assistance of Liam Brennan and Peter Baroni, Felony Assistants, DuPage County State’s Attorney’s Office, David Bergschneider, Legal Director, Office of State Appellate Defender, and Vittorio Terrizi, DuPage County Judge’s Staff Attorney, is noted with thanks.)