The law distrusts the inference that because a man has committed other crimes he is more likely to have committed the current one.1 In People v. Decker,2 the Illinois Supreme Court recognized there is nothing more damaging than to suggest or intimate to a jury the defendant has a criminal history.3 "Such evidence overpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment."4 Despite this evidentiary proclamation, Illinois courts allow evidence of other crimes if relevant for any purpose other than to show a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime.5 Illinois, unlike some states which have codified their other crimes rule,6 adopts a common-law rule admitting evidence offered to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, or modus operandi even though it may suggest the commission of another crime.7
Illinois courts, unlike many of its sister and federal courts, have never explicitly provided a test for admissibility of other crimes.8 In Huddleston v. United States,9 the United States Supreme Court adopted a four part test10 holding such evidence admissible if: (1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence is relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court instructs the jury that the similar acts are to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it is admitted.11 The Illinois Supreme Court, in contrast, has never provided such a formula.
A review of the relevant Illinois case law, however, reveals the routine consideration of four factors in determining whether to admit other crimes evidence, albeit never set forth in a concise formula. Illinois courts require the evidence to: (1) be relevant for any purpose other than propensity or conformity; (2) be sufficiently supported by proof; (3) be similar to the crime charged; and (4) have probative value outweighing the risk of unfair prejudice.
A. Relevant for a Non-Propensity Purpose
Under the first part of the "test," the evidence must be relevant for a proper purpose to be admissible.12 In general, evidence is relevant when it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."13 Illinois courts admit other crimes evidence only when the evidence is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime.14 Other crimes evidence is inadmissible for the sole purpose of enhancing or bolstering the credibility of the state’s witnesses.15
Illinois courts have cited several permissible purposes: modus operandi, intent, identity, motive, design or plan, and absence of mistake.16 The enumeration of these exceptions, however, does not represent the only purposes for which other crimes evidence can be admitted.17 Illinois courts have explicitly or implicitly recognized over thirty permissible purposes of other crimes evidence, some of which are variations of the six.18 For example, evidence of the commission of another crime is admissible if relevant to prove knowledge, defendant’s state of mind, absence of an innocent frame of mind or the presence of criminal intent, circumstances or context of defendant’s arrest, placement of defendant in proximity to the time and place of the crime, identification of the weapon used in the crime, consciousness of guilt, that the crime charged was part of a common design, scheme or plan of the defendant, circumstances of the crime charged that would otherwise be unclear, whether the crime charged was actually committed, opportunity or preparation, defendant’s dislike or attitude toward the victim, to explain an otherwise implausible fact relating to the crime charged, to contradict the defendant’s denials, to disprove a defense of entrapment, or to disprove an alibi defense.19
B. Proof of the Other Crime
The second prong addresses the degree of proof required concerning the other crime. In Huddleston v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted "preponderance of the evidence" as the standard of proof for other crimes evidence.20 Illinois courts, on the other hand, require the State to prove only that "a crime took place and that the defendant committed it or participated in its commission."21 Proof that an act occurred and the defendant participated need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,22 but such proof must be "more than a mere suspicion."23
The "more than a mere suspicion" standard, an unusual and ethereal requirement, has been justified by Illinois courts because the defendant is not on trial for the other act.24 In People v. Miller,25 which adopted this standard, the court applied it to other crimes evidence offered to prove motive or common scheme. Subsequent cases have applied this standard to all prior bad acts.26 Accordingly, courts have held that an acquittal of the prior offense does not necessarily render the evidence inadmissible, thereby rejecting estoppel by verdict and res judicata bars to the use of such evidence.27
C. Similarity Between Crime Charged and Other Crime
In People v. McKibbins,28 the Illinois Supreme Court stated for the first time that in establishing design or plan, there must be a degree of similarity between the facts of the crime charged and the other crimes evidence;29 where proof of other crimes is offered to prove absence of innocent frame of mind or criminal intent, "mere generalities of similarity will suffice."30 Five months later, the Illinois Supreme Court elaborated on its decision in McKibbins, stating in People v. Stewart that all other crimes evidence must have "some threshold similarity."31 The court stated:
Evidence of another crime, however, may be used only when the other crime has some threshold similarity to the crime charged. It is this similarity which increases the relevance of the evidence and ensures that it is not being used solely to establish the defendant’s criminal propensities.32
Given the important role afforded the similarity requirement, it is further considered in Parts V and VI of this Article.
D. Probative Value of Evidence Outweighs the Risk of Unfair Prejudice
Finally, the trial judge must weigh the prejudicial effect of admitting the other crimes evidence against its probative value.33 Other crimes evidence should be excluded where the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.34 On appeal, the issue of whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,35 and should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.36
III. Other Requirements Once Admitted
After weighing the above-referenced factors and deciding to admit other crimes evidence, Illinois Courts utilize two tools to minimize potential unfair prejudice: first, Illinois courts encourage the use of a limiting instruction; and second, they limit the details of the other crimes evidence.
A. Limiting Instruction
A jury instruction can be an effective means to limit the possible prejudicial effect of other crimes evidence.37 Whenever other crimes evidence is introduced, one should always tender Illinois Pattern Instruction No. 3.14.38 In People v. Heard,39 the Supreme Court acknowledged that it is good practice to instruct the jury, not only at the close of the case, but also at the time the other crimes evidence is admitted, of the limited purpose of the evidence, though not doing so does not necessarily constitute reversible error.40
Several problems have arisen with the use of jury instructions in other crimes evidence. The most common problem arises when the court and attorneys fail to modify or redact the standard jury instruction and thereby mistakenly leave in purposes which the court intended to exclude. The courts, generally, hold that the overly broad instruction constitutes harmless error.41 The courts have likewise held that where an instruction failed to include a purpose for which the evidence was introduced, it was not reversible error.42 Defendants have also unsuccessfully challenged the jury instruction because it does no clearly state the evidence is offered only for a limited purpose and not for the impermissible supposition of propensity to commit crime.43 One defendant argued, without success, that there should have been a separate jury instruction advising the jury to compare the characteristics of the two offenses to determine if they where sufficiently similar to permit an inference of identity.44 In People v. Richardson,45 the court rejected this argument because it had instructed the jury to determine the weight to give to the testimony of each witness, which the court presumed to include the duty of evaluating the testimony on the similarity of the two crimes.46 Despite the court’s rejection of challenges to the use or non-use of IPI 3.14, defendants and prosecutors alike should vigilantly request an appropriately modified limiting instruction at the time such evidence is introduced due to the potential prejudice attendant to other crimes evidence.
B. Limited Amount of Details
In People v. Bartall,47 the court stated, "The trial court should carefully limit evidence of another crime to evidence that is relevant to the issue on which the other crime is admitted."48 The determination of the amount of detail to allow into evidence involves the weighing of unfair prejudice and probative value.49 Three concerns justify the rule: first, this limitation prevents unnecessary prejudice to the defendant; second, it prevents a "mini-trial" on collateral issues;50 and third, it encourages judicial economy.51
While the details surrounding other crimes is generally admissible only to the extent necessary to accomplish the purpose of the evidence, some factual situations may necessitate a more detailed showing than others:
[I]f it would be difficult to explain or describe circumstances surrounding a defendant’s other crime without introducing a substantial amount of evidence concerning the other crime, then relevant, detailed evidence of the other crime is admissible to the extent necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.52
Given this potentially broad statement, Illinois courts have generally held that the admission of detailed other crimes evidence does not constitute prejudicial error.53
IV. Factors Not Given Importance
There are two factors Illinois courts do not afford great weight in determining the admissibility of other crimes evidence. The first factor, the remoteness in time between the two offenses, the courts still consider to some extent. The second factor, crimes subsequent to the one charged, is no longer an issue for admissibility.
A. Remoteness in Time
Although the time lapse between the two offenses is relevant to determining the admissibility of other crimes evidence, Illinois courts do not bar the introduction of a prior crime simply because it is too distant in time. In other words, remoteness in time is one fact in the totality of the circumstances, and is not, by itself, a determinative factor. In People v. Ward,54 the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that "[a] trial court may reject offered evidence on grounds of irrelevancy if it has little probative value due to its remoteness."55 The Court, however, backed off the possible implications of this statement, when it further observed:
[T]he admissibility of other-crimes evidence should not, and indeed cannot, be controlled solely by the number of years that have elapsed between the prior offense and the crime charged. The decision whether to admit or exclude such evidence must be made on a case-by-case basis by the trial judge responsible for evaluating the prohibitive value of the evidence.56
Generally, Illinois courts have been lenient in allowing remote evidence of other crimes, one case even allowing evidence of a prior act that occurred thirteen years before the charged crime.57
B. Crimes Subsequent to One Charged
Prior to People v. Bartall,58 some courts excluded evidence of other crimes occurring after the charged offense solely on that basis.59 The Bartall court, however, recognized that Illinois was peculiar in establishing a distinction between prior and subsequent crimes, and ruled that other crimes evidence should not be excluded because it was conduct that occurred subsequent to the charged crime.60 Thus, subsequent other crimes evidence is not analyzed in terms of its temporal existence, but simply by its relevance—i.e. whether it makes a fact of consequence more probable than it would be without such evidence.61
V. Legislative Exceptions
Effective January 1, 1998, the Illinois Legislature enacted two pieces of legislation concerning other crimes evidence. The First is 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3, Evidence in certain cases. Section 115-7.3 provides that if the defendant is accused of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal transmission of HIV, battery when the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual conduct, rape, deviate sexual assault, and indecent liberties with a child, evidence of the defendant’s commission of a prior offense may be admissible if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. Section 115-7.3(c) lists criteria for weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant.
The second other crimes statute effective January 1, 1998 was 725 ILCS 5/115-20, Evidence of prior conviction. Section 115-20 provides that if the defendant is accused of domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery against a family/household member, stalking, or violation of an order of protection, where the victim is the same victim of the prior offense that resulted in a conviction of the defendant, evidence of the prior conviction is admissible. Section 115-20(c) lists criteria for weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant. It should also be noted that by specifically referring to "convictions," Section 115-20 requires the prior offense be a conviction for it to be admissible under the statute.
The importance of these two statutes is unclear and, as of yet, there is no case law interpreting whether they in any way alter the common law— especially given that the statutes require courts to balance the probative value and undue prejudice to the defendant. One change, however, is that the prosecution must disclose the prior evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.62
VI. The Similarity Requirement
On appeal of criminal convictions, the most frequent basis for challenging other crimes evidence is that the offenses are too dissimilar. Yet, despite the prominence the similarity requirement has achieved, many courts and attorneys still fail to comprehend its application or importance. An attempt to elucidate this concept follows.
A. Threshold Similarity
In general, Illinois courts have required some threshold of similarity for all evidence of other crimes. "Evidence of another crime is admissible . . . only where there is sufficient similarity between the prior crime and the crime for which the defendant is being tried so that the evidence is relevant."63 People v. Bartall64 held that the other crimes evidence must possess some "threshold level of similarity to the crime charged."65
B. Dichotomy Between Similarity Requirements
The Illinois courts adopt a two-tier similarity requirement. In McKibbins, the Illinois Supreme Court held that when offering evidence to prove absence of an innocent frame of mind or intent, only "general areas" of similarity are necessary.66 Conversely, the court stated that when proving design or plan, there must be a higher degree of similarity.67 The court had already held, in People v. Tate,68 that modus operandi requires a strong and persuasive showing of similarity69 characterized as a "high" degree of similarity.70 Thus, although the Illinois courts have not always been clear on this issue, they require a "high degree" of similarity for design, scheme, plan, or modus operandi. Intent and absence of innocent frame of mind represent the lower standard of "general" similarity. As to evidence offered for purposes other than these stated, courts have not been clear; one appellate court indicated that all other purposes, such as motive, also fall under the "mere generalities" requirement.71 The critical issue under the similarity analysis, is what do the courts mean by the terms "high degree" and "mere generalities?" Part VII will address this issue by focusing on what the courts require as a minimum to satisfy these requirements.
C. Characteristics to Consider
Connecting two offenses for purposes of admissibility requires the prosecutor to draw factual similarities. Although Illinois courts have not given an exhaustive or systematic list of the type of similarities required, the courts have provided several examples. In Tate, the Illinois Supreme Court noted some general characteristics that may be used to link the offenses, "such as using similar weapons, dressing the same, acting with the same number of people, or even [using] a distinctive method of committing this particular offense."72 The court in People v. Phillips,73 noted that the list in Tate was "not meant to be all-inclusive or limiting on the trial court’s weighing and balancing of similarities and dissimilarities."74
Despite the courts’ reluctance to give a more expansive list, a review of the cases demonstrates numerous characteristics deemed sufficiently similar. The following are common features used in these cases: (1) similarity of victims;75 (2) similar time of day;76 (3) similarity of the attack;77 (4) similarity of physical assault;78 (5) similar manner of entry;79 (6) similarity of weapon;80 (7) similarity of identification of assailant, or similar clothing;81 (8) acting with same number of people;82 (9) similar car used;83 (10) similar statements made by assailant;84 (11) similarity of location of assault;85 and (12) the short period of time between the offenses.86
Conversely, when Illinois courts deem the similarities insufficient to admit as other crimes evidence, they generally fall into one of three categories:87 (1) the similarities are irrelevant coincidences, e.g., the victim drank heavily;88 (2) the similarities are common to many offenses of the type alleged, e.g., both victims were young girls who knew the assailant;89 and (3) the similarities are merely descriptive of the crime itself, e.g., force was used in all the assaults.90
D. Two Approaches for Linking Other Crimes Evidence to Charges Offense
Illinois courts acknowledge two methods to link a charged offense with evidence of another crime.91 The first method occurs when there are "definite and distinctive links" between the two "signature" offenses.92 In such cases, because of the uniqueness of the characteristic, the distinctive link can outweigh a number of dissimilarities.93 For example, the courts have found the following to be distinct links: when the defendant is accompanied by the same two individuals;94 where defendant was carrying the same weapon;95 when a meat cleaver was used in the both robberies;96 and when the victims were marched along railroad tracks in broad daylight.97
Conversely, several factors are deemed per se insufficient to prove similarity by themselves. For example, it has been held that time and proximity, without more, is an insufficient basis for admission of other crimes evidence.98 On the other hand, geographical proximity when combined with similarity in execution and the description of the accused are factors relevant to showing similarity."99 Also per se insufficient is evidence solely that the defendant has been identified as the perpetrator in both incidents.100
The second approach to linking other crimes evidence to a charged offense applies where there is no "signature" evidence. Absent a particular unique factor, Illinois courts focus on the totality of the factors to determine probativeness.101 The offense may be admitted if "the similarities the crimes share are sufficiently distinctive when considered together to yield the inference that the same person authored both crimes."102 In these cases, a few dissimilarities may destroy the effect of the similarities.103
In evaluating similarities under the totality of the factors test, Illinois courts balance the similarities and dissimilarities. The trend in Illinois requires the similarities to outnumber the dissimilarities.104 The courts, however, have qualified this statement by recognizing that the primary focus is still on the similarities: "[W]hat is important is the similitude of the defendant’s overall conduct in each instance."105
VII. Similarity Necessary For Specific Purposes
Weinstein’s treatise on evidence states: "The degree of similarity required . . . will depend on the evidential hypothesis which is being employed . . . ." 106 With Illinois having a two-tiered system— modus operandi, design, scheme and plan requiring a "high" degree of similarity and intent requiring only "general similarities— a careful examination of what these terms mean is vitally important in determining whether other crimes evidence is admissible. An examination of one purpose qualifying under the "high" degree of similarities and one purpose representing "general similarities," may assist in defining these terms.
A. High Degree of Similarities— Proving Modus Operandi
Modus operandi evidence typically is used to prove identity. To be admissible under the modus operandi exception, Illinois requires the crimes to share "peculiar and distinctive features that are strikingly similar."107 In other words, "there must be a high degree of identity between the facts of the crime charged and the other offenses."108 The offense must be so similar that evidence of one crime tends to prove the defendant guilty of the crime charged.109
This requirement of a "high" degree of similarity when suing modus operandi to prove identity is explained by Wigmore:
[I]n the process of identification of two supposed objects, by a common mark, the force of the inference depends on the degree of necessariness of association of that mark with a single object. . . . The process of constructing an inference of identity thus usually consists in adding together a number of circumstances, each of which by itself might be a feature of many objects, but all of which together make it more probable that they coexist in a single object. Each additional circumstance reduces the chances of there being more than one object so associated.110
Stated otherwise, the test for admissibility for identity is: "A mark common to two supposed objects is receivable to show them to be identical whenever in human experience the mark does not occur with so many objects that the chances of the two supposed objects are too small to be appreciable."111
Illinois courts, however, do not require that the crimes be identical112 or "so distinctive as to amount to a signature."113 As one court observed, "It is well-established . . . that for evidence of other crimes to be admissible for the purposes of establishing modus operandi the other crimes need not be completely identical."114 Some dissimilarities may exist without making the evidence inadmissible, because some dissimilarity will always exist between independent offenses. 115 Dissimilarities, unless they combine to render the evidence lacking in probity, go to the weight given the evidence, not its admissibility.116
At one end of the spectrum are cases involving startling similarities where the test is easily satisfied. For example, in People v. Smith,117 the court counted 13 similarities including a similar manner of sexual assault, talking to the victim after the assault, and that both assaults occurred in a three week period in the same area of town.118
At the other end of the spectrum are the cases in which similarities are more tenuous, or the dissimilarities more glaring. People v. Hayes,119 with a vigorous dissent, represents the outside range of admissibility. In the Hayes armed robbery trial, the court admitted other crimes evidence for modus operandi based on four similarities: (1) both occurred at the same hour; (2) both occurred at the same shopping center; (3) both assailants used a silver colored gun; and (4) both assailants used a bag to collect the money.120 The offenses were also committed within six weeks of each other.121 The appellate court affirmed the admissibility of the evidence, despite a dissent that argued there were too many dissimilarities, not the least of which included inconsistent assailant descriptions.122
Another case on the fringe of admissibility is People v. Stevenson,123 where the court admitted other crimes evidence to show modus operandi where: "Both victims were males of a slight build and were struck on the head with a similar instrument, at night, in the same geographical area and within two months of each other. They were both hit with an over the head swing [sic] if a weapon while facing the assailant, both attacks were sudden and unexpected and were characterized by silence on the part of defendant."124
There exist about a dozen published Illinois opinions where the court rejected the State’s argument that the offenses were similar. The classic example is People v. Connolly,125 which had only three similarities: (1) the perpetrator forced entry into a commercial establishment in the morning hours; (2) the perpetrator attempted to disarm the alarm; and (3) the offenses were three years apart.126 The court held the evidence was too dissimilar because the characteristics were common to many burglaries. Likewise, in People v. Geitz127 the court found six similarities too common to justify an admissible inference: (1) the perpetrator wore dark gloves; (2) the perpetrator was fascinated with anal/oral sexual activity; (3) the assailant ejaculated in the mouth of the victim; (4) the assailant asked for a person’s name when there was no one at the location with the name; (5) the offenses occurred at night; and (6) the victims all positively identified the defendant as the assailant.128 The court stated that the similarities were common to many sexual assaults.129
B. "General Similarities"—To Prove Intent
Illinois courts do not require the other crimes evidence offered for intent to possess the same level of similarity as when used to prove modus operandi.130 "Mere general areas of similarity" may be sufficient where evidence of the other crime is offered for the presence of criminal intent or absence of an innocent frame of mind.131
"Intent is probably the most frequently employed category for admitting other crimes evidence."132 As explained by Wigmore, the intent exception is premised on the doctrine of chances:
The argument here is purely from the point of view of the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all. Without formulating any accurate test, and without attempting by numerous instances to secure absolute certainty of inference, the mind applies this rough and instinctive process of reasoning, namely, that an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present in one instance, but that the oftener similar instances occur with similar results, the less likely is the abnormal element likely to be the true explanation of them.133
Wigmore, often cited by Illinois courts for his analysis of the intent exception, explains the need for similarity: "[I]t is at least necessary that prior acts should be similar. Since it is the improbability of a like result being repeated by mere chance that carries probative weight, the essence of this probative effect is the likeness of the instance."134
Wigmore, however, also explains that when offered for intent, courts are dramatically inconsistent:
It is just this requirement of similarity which leaves so much room for differences of opinion, and accounts for the bewildering variances of rulings in the different jurisdictions, and even in the same jurisdiction and in cases of the same offense. Some judges treat the judicial test of probative value as identical with the common-sense test, admitting such instances as bear a similarity liberally interpreted by the standard if everyday reasoning. Other judges set their faces firmly against every instance which is not on all fours with the offense in issue . . . . It is hopeless to attempt to reconcile the precedents under the various head; for too much depends on the tendency of the court in dealing with a flexible principle.135
Trying to reconcile the various applications of the intent exception in Illinois is likewise impossible. In several cases abundant similarities justify admission of the other offense.136 Borderline cases of the intent exception are rare; therefore any meaningful analysis of the intent category is not possible. One example, however, is People v. Embry,137 where the defendant, four days before the charged crime of child abduction, approached a grade school girl and asked if she wanted a ride.138 The appellate court rejected the defendant’s claim that the other offense was "too general" and held that it satisfied the lesser standard of "general similarities."139
At first glance, seemingly disparate rulings by Illinois courts make the use and application of other crimes evidence confusing. A careful review of these same precedents, however, discloses certain unifying principles that can be used to argue cogently for or against the admissibility of other crimes evidence. In essence, Illinois courts consider four factors in considering this evidence: (1) relevance for purposes other than propensity or conformity; (2) sufficiency of the proof; (3) similarities in the offenses; and (4) whether the probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. As to the similarity requirement, the necessary level depends upon the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Understanding these concepts is the first step towards successfully arguing for or against other crimes evidence at trial.
1. People v. Lehman, 5 Ill.2d 337, 125 N.E.2d 506 (Ill. 1955).
2. People v. Decker, 310 Ill. 234, 141 N.E.2d 710 (Ill. 1923).
3. Id. at 714.
4. People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill.2d 238, 402 N.E.2d 238 (Ill. 1980).
5. People v. Dewey, 42 Ill.2d 148, 246 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. 1969).
6. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is in effect in over thirty states. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 575, 575 (1990).
7. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. 1983).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 1994) (adopting four part test: (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the propensity to commit the crime; (2) the evidence is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the other crime; and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); State v. Campbell, 683 So. 2d 1302, 1304 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (adopting a four part test: (1) the State must comply with notice requirements and limiting instruction; (2) prove by clear and convincing evidence that the other bad act occurred and was committed by defendant; (3) show that the evidence falls within one of the permitted exceptions; and (4) show that the probative value of the evidence outweighs is potential prejudicial value); State v. Henderson, 925 P.2d 475, 378 (Mont. 1996) (stating four part test: (1) the other crimes must be similar; (2) the other crimes must not be remote in time; (3) the evidence is not admissible for prove the character of a person in order to show conformity with such character, but for a permissible purpose; (4) may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); State v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1215 (N.H. 1996) (stating three part test: (1) it is relevant for a purpose other than to show the defendant’s bad character; (2) there is clear proof that the defendant committed the other crimes; (3) prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence).
9. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
10. The majority of federal circuits and several states presently utilize this test. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565 568 (2d Cir. 1990); Government of Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 419 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1038-39 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Haynes, 881 F.2d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Howard, 855 F.2d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Miller, 895 F.2f 1431, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1990); State v. Roscoe, 910 P.2d 635, 644 (Ariz. 1996); People v. McMillian, 539 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Mich. 1995); State v. Hernandez, 493 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Neb. 1992); State v. McKinney, 430 S.E.2d 300, 304 (N.C. App. 1993); Blakely v. State, 841 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 524 (W.Va. 1994).
11. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. at 691-92.
12. People v. Lehman, 5 Ill.2d 337, 125 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ill. 1955)
13. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 583 N.E.2d 515, 604 (Ill. 1991); People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 473 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1980) See also Fed. R. Evid. 401
14. People v. McDonald, 62 Ill.2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489 (Ill. 1975); People v. Dewey, 42 Ill.2d 148, 246 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. 1969).
15. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d 81, 705 N.E.2d 850 (Ill. 1998); People v. Romero, 66 Ill.2d 325, 362 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. 1977);
16. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, 824-25 (Ill. 1983).
17. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 473 N.E.2d 840, 861 (Ill. 1984).
18. Robert S. Hunter, Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers: Criminal (6th ed. 1989) (listing twenty eight permissible purposes).
19. People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill.App.3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292,1295-96 (1st Dist. 1985).
20. People v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
21. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill.2d 409, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1348 (Ill. 1996); People v. Phillips, 127 Ill.2d 499, 538 N.E2d 500 (Ill. 1989); Wernowsky v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 106 Ill.2d 49, 477 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 1985).
22. People v. Baptist, 76 Ill.2d 19, 389 N.E.2d 1200 (Ill. 1979); People v. Smith, 3 Ill.App.3d 958, 279 N.E.2d 512 (4th Dist. 1972).
23. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill.2d 409, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1348 (Ill. 1996); People v. Rozo, 303 Ill.App.3d 787, 708 N.E.2d 1229 (2nd Dist. 1999); People v. Gugliotta, 81 Ill.App.3d 362, 401 N.E.2d 262 (2nd Dist. 1980).
24. Wernowsky v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 106 Ill.2d 49, 477 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 1985).
25. People v. Miller, 55 Ill.App.3d 421, 370 N.E.2d 1155 (1st Dist. 1977).
26. See, e.g., People v. Oaks, 169 Ill.2d 409, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1348 (Ill. 1996).
27. People v. Osborn, 53 Ill.App.3d 312, 368 N.E.2d 608, 616 (1st Dist. 1977) (allowing evidence of a prior act even though the charge for the alleged crime was dismissed after a preliminary hearing).
28. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. 1983).
29. Id. at 825.
31. People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59,67 (Ill. 1983).
33. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 473 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1984).
34. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 583 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. 1991).
35. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 473 N.E.2d 840, 860 (Ill.1984).
36. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 583 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. 1991).
37. People v. Maxwell, 148 Ill.2d 116, 592 N.E.2d 960, 967 (Ill. 1992); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 583 N.E.2d 515, 525 (Ill. 1991); People v. Wolfbrandt, 127 Ill.App.3d 836, 469 N.E.2d 305, 313 (3rd Dist. 1984). See, also Illinois Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (2d ed. 1981).
38. The standard Illinois jury instructions state in part: "Evidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in crimes other than that charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received solely on the issue of the defendant’s identification, presence, intent, motive, design, knowledge." Illinois Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (2d ed. 1981).
39. People v. Heard, 187 Ill.2d 36, 718 N.E.2d 58 (Ill. 1999).
40. People v. Heard, 187 Ill.2d 36, 718 N.E.2d 58 (Ill. 1999).
41. People v. Williams, 185 Ill.App.3d 840, 541 N.E.2d 1175,1187 (1st Dist. 1989); People v. Leaks, 179 Ill.App.3d 231, 534 N.E.2d 491, 496-97 (1st Dist. 1989) (finding it harmless error that court mistakenly added to the instruction identification and design); People v. Lieberman, 107 Ill.App.3d 949, 438 N.E.2d 516, 521-22 (1st Dist. 1982) (finding that the instruction mistakenly included presence, intent, motive, design and knowledge, but nonetheless did not effect the jury’s decision). But see People v. Connors, 82 Ill.App.3d 312, 402 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist. 1980) (finding that instruction which included all possible exceptions to the other crimes rule magnified the error of allowing the other evidence).
42. People v. Luczak, 306 Ill.App.3d 319, 714 N.E.2d 995 (1st Dist. 1999).
43. People v. Willis, 184 Ill.App.3d 1033, 540 N.E.2d 1080, 1086 (1st Dist. 1989).
44. People v. Richardson, 123 Il.2d 322, 528 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. 1988).
45. People v. Richardson, 123 Il.2d 322, 528 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. 1988).
47. People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59 (Ill. 1983).
48. Id. at 69.
49. See People v. Robinson, 167 Ill.2d 53, 656 N.E.2d 1090,1096 (Ill. 1995); People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59 (Ill. 1983).
50. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill.2d 53, 656 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (Ill. 1995); People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. 1983).
51. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, 826 (Ill. 1983).
52. People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill.App.3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (1st Dist. 1985).
53. See, e.g., People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59, 69 (Ill. 1983); People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, 826 (Ill. 1983). But see People v. Bennett, 281 Ill.App.3d 814, 666 N.E.2d 899 (1st Dist. 1996) (finding that the additional evidence of a injury to a witness was inadmissible because it was not relevant to establish modus operandi).
54. People v. Ward, 101 Ill.2d 443, 463 N.E.2d 696 (Ill. 1984).
56. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 583 N.E.2d 515, 522 (Ill. 1991).
57. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill.2d 53, 656 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (Ill. 1995). See also People v. Luczak, 306 Ill.App.3d 319, 714 N.E.2d 995 (1st Dist. 1999) (holding that other crimes evidence of prior sexual assault against another victim six years earlier was not too remote); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 583 N.E.2d 515, 522 (Ill. 1991) (reversing the appellate court and upholding trial courts determination that evidence of spousal abuse that occurred throughout 19 year marriage, with last abuse occurring three years before victims death was not too remote); People v. Brown, 199 Ill.App.3d 860, 557 N.E.2d 611 (1st Dist. 1990) (holding that evidence that defendant caused death of another child three years earlier was not too remote in child abuse prosecution); People v. Barber, 116 Ill.App.3d 767, 452 N.E.2d 725 (3rd Dist. 1983) (holding that evidence that defendant wrote threatening letter to victim two years before victim’s death was not too remote to be relevant).
58. People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59 (Ill. 1983).
59. People v. Hobbs, 297 Ill. 399, 130 N.E.2d 779 (Ill. 1921); People v. Brand, 415 Ill. 329, 114 N.E.2d 370 (Ill. 1953).
60. Id. at 68.
61. See People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill.App.3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (1st Dist. 1985).
62 See 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(d) and 725 ILCS 5/115-20(d).
63. People v. Wydra, 265 Ill.App.3d 597, 637 N.E.2d 741, 754 (1st Dist. 1994) (citing People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59, 67 (Ill. 1983).
64. People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59 (Ill. 1983).
65. Id. at 67.
66. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ill. 1983).
68. People v. Tate, 87 Ill.2d 134, 429 N.E.2d 470,474 (Ill. 1981).
70. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 643 N.E.2d 636, 653 (Ill. 1994).
71. People v. McGhee, 238 Ill.2d 864, 605 N.E.2d 1039, 1049 (2nd Dist. 1992) ("We perceive no reason to engraft the similarity-of-crimes requirement of [the modus operndi] exception onto the motive exception in this case.").
72. People v. Tate, 87 Ill.2d 134, 429 N.E.2d 470, 475 (Ill. 1981); see also People v. Willis, 184 Ill.App.3d 1033, 540 N.E.2d 1080,1082 (1st Dist. 1989).
73. People v. Phillips, 127 Ill.2d 499, 538 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. 1989).
74. Id. at 509.
75. Id. (same store clerk); People v. Robinson, 268 Ill.App.3d 1019, 645 N.E.2d 437 (1st Dist. 1994) (elderly women); People v. Walker, 253 Ill.App.3d 93, 624 N.E.2d 1353 (1st Dist. 1993) (young african-american women); People v. Stevenson, 204 Ill.App.3d 342, 562 N.E.2d 330 (1st Dist. 1990) (males with slight builds); People v. Partin, 156 Ill.App.3d 365, 509 N.E.2d 662 (1st Dist. 1987) (young males age 14 to 15).
76. People v. King, 248 Ill.App.3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709 (1st Dist. 1993) (11 a.m.); People v. Houston, 240 Ill.App.3d 754, 608 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist. 1992) (attacks in morning hours); People v. Willis, 184 Ill.App.3d 1033, 540 N.E.2d 1080,1082 (1st Dist. 1989) (Saturday); People v. Johnson, 107 Ill.App.3d 156, 437 N.E.2d 436 (3rd Dist. 1982) (daylight); People v. Kirkwood, 812 Ill.App.3d 252, 402 N.E.2d 677 (1st Dist. 1980) (service station closing time).
77. People v. Biggers, 273 Ill.App.3d 116, 652 N.E.2d 474, 479 (4th Dist. 1995) (took money from both lottery and cash registers); People v. Robinson, 2 Ill.App.3d 1019, 645 N.E.2d 437 (1st Dist. 1994) (attacked in garage while coming home); People v. Walker, 253 Ill.App.3d 93, 624 N.E.2d 1353 (1st Dist. 1993) (pretending to be jogger and then attacking from behind); People v. Burgin, 74 Ill.App.3d 58, 392 N.E.2d 251 (1st Dist. 1979) (attacker riding a bicycle).
78. People v. Walker, 253 Ill.App.3d 93, 624 N.E.2d 1353 (1st Dist. 1993) (same sex acts)
79. People v. King, 248 Ill.App.3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709, 719-20 (1st Dist. 1993) (broke ground floor window).
80. People v. Houston, 240 Ill.App.3d 754, 608 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist. 1992) (knife); People v. Johnson, 219 Ill.App.3d 460, 579 N.E.2d 978 (1st Dist. 1991) (butcher knife); People v. Tipton, 207 Ill.App.3d 688, 566 N.E.2d 352 (1st Dist. 1990) (meat cleaver); People v. Hayes, 168 Ill.App.3d 816, 522 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (1st Dist. 1988) (silver gun).
81. People v. Biggers, 273 Ill.App.3d 116, 652 N.E.2d 474, 479 (4th Dist. 1995) (same clothing-sunglasses and baseball cap); People v. Robinson, 268 Ill.App.3d 1019, 645 N.E.2d 437 (1st Dist. 1994) (white mask or hood); People v. Houston, 240 Ill.App.3d 754, 608 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist. 1992) (identified by victims); People v. Johnson, 219 Ill.App.3d 460, 579 N.E.2d 978 (1st Dist. 1991) (same clothing and identified by 3 of 4 victims); People v. Patten, 230 Ill.App.3d 922, 595 N.E.2d 1141, 1146 (1st Dist. 1992) (three of four victims identified assailant); People v. Pavic, 104 Ill.App.3d 436, 432 N.E.2d 1074 (1st Dist. 1982) (blue knit cap).
82. People v. Miller, 254 Ill.App.3d 997, 626 N.E.2d 1350 (1st Dist. 1993) (three men in home repair scheme); People v. Kirkwood, 812 Ill.App.3d 252, 402 N.E.2d 677 (1st Dist. 1980) (three men in same car).
83. People v. Kirkwood, 812 Ill.App.3d 252, 402 N.E.2d 677 (1st Dist. 1980) (1971 or 1972 Oldsmobile); People v. Patten, 230 Ill.App.3d 922, 595 N.E.2d 11411146 (1st Dist. 1992) (small red car).
84. People v. King, 248 Ill.App.3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709, 719-20 (1st Dist. 1993) (during sexual assault told to "put it in"); People v. Hall, 35 Ill.App.3d 418, 601 N.E.2d 883 (1st Dist. 1992) (after assault stated "you did good); People v. Tipton, 207 Ill.App.3d 688, 566 N.E.2d 352 (1st Dist. 1990) (threatened decapitation of hands); People v. Brown, 214 Ill.App.3d 836, 574 N.E.2d 190 (1st Dist. 1991) (asked peculiar "favor" question and offered money for their clothes after assault); People v. Willis, 184 Ill.App.3d 1033, 540 N.E.2d 1080 (1st Dist. 1989) (told the caliber of gun and would be shot if ran); People v. Burgin, 74 Ill.App.3d 58, 392 N.E.2d 251 (1st Dist. 1979) (initiated conversation with vulgar remark).
85. People v. King, 248 Ill.App.3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709, 719-20 (1st Dist. 1993) (within one block of defendant’s house) People v. Miller, 254 Ill.App.3d 997, 626 N.E.2d 1350 (1st Dist. 1993) (Cicero); People v. Houston, 240 Ill.App.3d 754, 608 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist. 1992) (DePaul area); People v. Berry, 244 Ill.App.3d 14, 613 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (1st Dist. 1991) (within one block); People v. Hayes, 168 Ill.App.3d 816, 522 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (1st Dist. 1988) (same shopping plaza); People v. Bullock, 154 Ill.App.3d 266, 507 N.E.2d 44 (1st Dist. 1987) (eight blocks); People v. Burgin, 74 Ill.App.3d 58, 392 N.E.2d 251 (1st Dist. 1979) (south of Northwestern Library).
86. People v. Robinson, 268 Ill.App.3d 1019, 645 N.E.2d 437 (1st Dist. 1994) (8 days); People v. King, 248 Ill.App.3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709, 719-20 (1st Dist. 1993) (24 hours); People v. Miller, 254 Ill.App.3d 997, 626 N.E.2d 1350 (1st Dist. 1993) (four months); People v. Berry, 244 Ill.App.3d 14, 613 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (1st Dist. 1991) (three weeks); People v. Houston, 240 Ill.App.3d 754, 608 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist. 1992) (three months); People v, Charles, 238 Ill.App.3d 752, 606 N.E.2d 603 (1st Dist. 1992) (15 minutes); People v. Johnson, 219 Ill.App.3d 460, 579 N.E.2d 978 (1st Dist. 1991) (15 minutes).
87. People v. Woltz, 288 Ill.App.3d 670, 592 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Dist. 1992) (stating reasons two and three); People v. Hayes, 168 Ill.App.3d 816, 522 N.E.2d 1279, 1289 (1st Dist. 1988) (Pincham, J., dissenting) (stating reasons one and three).
88. People v. Hayes, 168 Ill.App.3d 816, 522 N.E.2d 1279, 1289 (1st Dist. 1988).
89. People v. Woltz, 288 Ill.App.3d 670, 592 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Dist. 1992).
90. People v. Hayes, 168 Ill.App.3d 816, 522 N.E.2d 1279, 1289 (1st Dist. 1988). See also People v. Woltz, 288 Ill.App.3d 670, 592 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Dist. 1992) (some force was used in assaults and both victims had their sexual organs penetrated by assailant).
91. People v. Biggers, 273 Ill.App.3d 116, 652 N.E.2d 474, 479 (4th Dist. 1995); People v. Berry, 244 Ill.App.3d 14, 613 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (1st Dist. 1991).
92. People v. Biggers, 273 Ill.App.3d 116, 652 N.E.2d 474, 479 (4th Dist. 1995).
94. People v. Maxwell, 148 Ill.App.3d 116, 592 N.E.2d 960 (Ill. 1992).
95. People v. Taylor, 101 Ill.App.3d 508, 463 N.E.2d 705, 712 (Ill. 1984); People v. Williams, 285 Ill.App.3d 394, 673 N.E.2d 1169, 1175 (4th Dist. 1996).
96. People v. Tipton, 207 Ill.App.3d 688, 566 N.E.2d 352, 358 (1st Dist. 1991).
97. People v. Hall, 186 Ill.App.3d 123, 541 N.E.2d 1369, 1372 (1st Dist. 1989).
98. People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill.2d 238, 402 N.E.2d 238 (Ill. 1980).; People v. Lee, 151 Ill.App.3d 510, 502 N.E.2d 399, 406 (1st Dist. 1986); People v. Charles, 238 Ill.App.3d 752, 606 N.E.2d 603, 610 (1st Dist. 1992); People v. Buchanan, 211 Ill.App.3d 305, 570 N.E.2d 344, 355 (1st Dist. 1991) (holding that even though the state only linked the offenses by proximity in time and location, it is not reversible error because it did not provide direct evidence of defendant’s participation in prior crimes, it only was a suggestion of criminality).
99. People v. Patten, 230 Ill.App.3d 922, 595 N.E.2d 1141, 1146 (1st Dist. 1992); see also People v. Willis, 184 Ill.App.3d 1033, 540 N.E.2d 1080,1085 (1st Dist. 1989).
100. People v. Biggers, 273 Ill.App.3d 116, 652 N.E.2d 474, 479 (4th Dist. 1995).
101. Id.; People v. Jones, 156 Ill.2d 225, 620 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Ill. 1993).
102. People v. Berry, 244 Ill.App.3d 14, 613 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (1st Dist. 1991).
103. People v. Biggers, 273 Ill.App.3d 116, 652 N.E.2d 474, 479 (4th Dist. 1995).
104. People v. Miller, 254 Ill.App.3d 997, 626 N.E.2d 1350 (1st Dist. 1993); (People v. Houston, 240 Ill.App.3d 754, 608 N.E.2d 46, 52 (1st Dist. 1992).
105. People v. Houston, 240 Ill.App.3d 754, 608 N.E.2d 46, 52 (1st Dist. 1992); Bullock, 154 Ill.App.3d 266, 507 N.E.2d 44, 47 (1st Dist. 1987); Watson, 98 Ill.App.3d 296, 424 N.E.2d 329 (5th Dist. 1981).
106. 2 Jack Weinstein, Evidence § 404.
107. People v.Dickerson 119 Ill.App.3d 568, 456 N.E.2d 920, 925 (1st Dist. 1983) (citing People v. Middleton, 38 Ill.App.3d 984, 350 N.E.2d 223, 228 (1st Dist. 1976).
108. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 583 N.E.2d 515, 523 (Ill. 1991).
109. People v. McKibbons, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ill. 1983).
110. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trails at Common Law § 411 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
111. Id. at § 412.
112. People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill.App.3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (1st Dist.. 1985) (citing People v. Anderson, 108 Ill.App.3d 563, 439 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1st Dist. 1982).
113. People v. Bryan, 159 Ill.App.3d 46, 511 N.E.2d 1289, 1293 (1st Dist. 1987).
114. People v. King, 248 Ill.App.3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709, 720 (1st Dist. 1993).
115. People v. Taylor, 101 Ill.2d 508, 463 N.E.2d 705, 712 (Ill. 1984).
116. People v. Tipton, 207 Ill.App.3d 688, 566 N.E.2d 352, 358 (1st Dist. 1990); see also People v. King, 248 Ill.App.3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709, 721 (1st Dist. 1993).
117. People v. Smith, 236 Ill.App.3d 1060, 602 N.E.2d 1388 (5th Dist. 1992).
118. Id. at 1391.
119. People v. Hayes, 168 Ill.App.3d 816, 522 N.E.2d 1279 (1st Dist. 1988).
120. Id. at 1282.
123. People v. Stevenson, 204 Ill.App.3d 342, 562 N.E.2d 330 (1st Dist. 1990).
124. Id. at 333.
125. People v. Connolly, 186 Ill.App.3d 429, 542 N.E.2d 517 (4th Dist. 1989).
126. Id. at 521.
127. People v. Geitz, 138 Ill.App.3d 670, 485 N.E.2d 1349 (5th Dist. 1985).
128. Id. at 1352.
130. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 643 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. 1994); People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. 1983).
131. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 643 N.E.2d 636, 653 (Ill. 1994).
132. 2 Jack Weinstein, Evidence § 404.
133. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trails at Common Law § 302 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
134. 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trails at Common Law § 302 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
136. See People v. Charles, 238 Ill.App.3d 752, 606 N.E.2d 603, 610 (1st Dist. 1992) (involving two assaults with shotguns within 15 minutes and in same geographical area.).
137. People v. Embry, 177 Ill.App.3d 96, 531 N.E.2d 1130 (4th Dist. 1988).
138. Id. at 505.
139. Id. at 508.
Scott Sinson is an Assistant State’s Attorney assigned to the Juvenile Division in DuPage County, Illinois. He received his Undergraduate Degree from Princeton University in 1993 and his Law Degree from Drake University in 1997.