Lead Editor’s Note: Last month’s issue of the Brief featured an article by Aaron H. Reinke on the subject of preliminary injunctive relief. In this month’s issue, author Michael D. McCormick offers additional insight on this important subject, including extensive treatment of the procedural aspects of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. We trust that our readers will find both articles extremely informative.
A former employee copied confidential customer files and is soliciting those customers.1
Village trustees fired village attorneys and hired new counsel without authority.2
An employer illegally recorded telephone conversations and is threatening to destroy the tapes.3 Officers of a not-for-profit corporation disqualified a Board candidate.4
Each of these emergency situations requires extraordinary relief. Section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure may provide the means of obtaining temporary injunctive relief in each instance.5
Temporary restraining orders ("TROs") and preliminary injunctions are frequently referred to as "extraordinary relief," for good reason. They seek the court’s immediate intervention in the lives or business of the parties. The extraordinary nature of this relief requires proof of an extraordinary need for judicial intervention.
I. TROs under 735 ILCS 11-101
Section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides procedures for seeking temporary injunctive relief. A TRO is an emergency remedy issued to maintain the status quo until a hearing on an application for preliminary injunction.6 Under Section 11-101, a TRO without notice will expire in ten days. Like a preliminary injunction, however, a TRO with notice may be effective indefinitely, usually until a preliminary injunction hearing.7 Like a TRO under Section 11-101, a preliminary injunction under Section 11-102 is an extraordinary remedy available only in situations where an extreme emergency exists and serious harm would result if it is not issued, to maintain the status quo pending a hearing on the merits.8
The factors the court will consider on motions for TRO or preliminary injunction are similar. Plaintiff must demonstrate:
1. a clearly ascertainable right which needs protection;
2. irreparable harm without protection of the injunction;
3. no adequate remedy at law;
4. substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and
5. plaintiff will suffer greater harm without the injunction than defendant will suffer if it is issued.9
The court will not examine these factors to resolve factual issues on the merits. The court will determine whether movant has established a prima facie case for maintaining the status quo.10 What is the status quo? It is not the status of the dispute as of the filing of the petition for TRO. That precipitated the filing and the need for judicial relief. The status quo is "the last peaceable uncontested status that preceded litigation."11 It is inappropriate for a TRO to award affirmative relief or to alter the status quo.12 Such a change in status between the parties must await a hearing on the merits. A TRO is intended merely to preserve the merits of the controversy pending a full evidentiary hearing. The court generally will seek the parties’ agreement to maintain the status quo pending a hearing. Counsel will be well advised to avoid making the court’s decision more difficult by refusing to maintain the status quo until the court can schedule a hearing.13 The better approach is to argue that movant has no clearly ascertained right to emergency relief or that the TRO movant requests would alter the status quo.
II. Procedure for Obtaining Temporary Injunctive Relief
Section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure envisions the party seeking a TRO to file a motion or petition for TRO together with a verified complaint or an unverified complaint with affidavits.14 Although the court will not determine the merits of the controversy at the TRO hearing, the motion or petition for TRO must allege evidentiary facts raising a fair question as to the existence of the right claimed, warranting preserving the status quo pending a full hearing. Because the court does not hear evidence on a motion for TRO, the statement of facts in the verified complaint and affidavits rise in importance to the level of trial evidence. The complaint and affidavits must tell the client’s story as convincingly as a summation of trial evidence. In addition, the memorandum in support of the motion for TRO must show convincingly that the movant has a legal right in need of temporary protection pending a full hearing.
Affidavits filed in support of a motion for TRO must comply with Supreme Court Rule 191, based on the personal knowledge of the witness.15 Affidavits or allegations in the verified complaint on information and belief are insufficient support for an application for a TRO or a preliminary injunction.16 Similarly, although the court usually will hear arguments of counsel at the TRO hearing, arguments of counsel are not evidence and cannot provide the facts to support the factors the court will examine at the hearing on the motion.17 The verified complaint or petition and affidavits, not the arguments of counsel, however compelling, provide the evidence supporting the motion.
The verified petition and affidavits form the factual basis of the court’s determination of a motion for TRO. Respondent generally has little time to investigate and form a defense, but respondent should answer any complaint or petition and file counter affidavits prior to the hearing. Doing so will demonstrate to the court that a genuine controversy exists, that respondent will contest the merits, and that no findings or merits-based rulings should be made without a hearing. In addition, respondent should file a motion for expedited discovery to prepare for a hearing on a preliminary injunction and minimize the duration of the TRO.
III. Nature of the Hearing
On a motion for preliminary injunction, the status of the pleadings may determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. Because of the abbreviated and emergency nature of proceedings on a motion for TRO, however, with the hearing possibly taking place minutes after the action is filed, a TRO hearing is a summary proceeding not requiring an evidentiary hearing. The Second District noted this distinction between TROs and preliminary injunctions in Passon v. TCR, Inc.18 In Passon, plaintiffs filed a petition seeking a TRO, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction. Defendants answered the complaint and filed a counter petition for TRO. At the hearing on whether a TRO should be entered, the court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the injunction should be made permanent. Defendants appealed.
The Second District reversed, noting: "The classification of an order as a TRO or a preliminary injunction will be determinative of the type of hearing required for the issuance of the order."19 An evidentiary hearing is required on a motion for preliminary injunction where a verified answer is filed denying material allegations of the complaint, but "A hearing on a motion for a TRO is a summary proceeding, and even if the defendant files a verified answer, the court still proceeds in a summary fashion, hearing only arguments on the motion for the TRO."20
The 1967 revisions to Injunction Act established a distinction between TROs and preliminary injunctions. Prior to those revisions, the Act merely provided for "temporary injunctions." Such temporary injunctions would not issue without an evidentiary hearing where a verified answer was filed controverting material allegations of the complaint.21 In Paddington Corp. v. Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc.,22 the court noted that because a TRO is "an emergency remedy of extremely brief duration" an answer denying material allegations does not preclude entry of a TRO.23
Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a party’s rights are adjudicated.24 As a general rule, notice of a motion for TRO is required. When a party moves for a TRO ex parte, courts often will continue the hearing for a brief period and require movant to give some form of notice. Section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no TRO shall be entered without notice "unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon."25 Section 11-102 specifically provides that no court may grant a preliminary injunction without notice.
Under Section 11-101, a TRO granted without notice will expire within ten days of its entry. For good cause shown, the TRO may be extended another ten days. If the TRO is entered without notice, "the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence over all matters except matters of the same character." If plaintiff fails to proceed on the motion for preliminary injunction, the court will dissolve the TRO.26
A motion for TRO with notice and motion for preliminary injunction with notice seek the same type of relief and require the same elements of proof.27 Unlike TROs without notice, Section 11-101 does not provide that a TRO with notice will expire in ten days. A TRO with notice will be effective until further order of court, usually through the preliminary injunction hearing.28
The type of notice required on a motion for TRO is flexible. Personal service of all pleadings and motions is required under Supreme Court Rule 104, but even under that rule, "For good cause shown on ex parte application, the court may excuse service." While personal service of the motion or petition for TRO is preferred, notice by telephone may be appropriate in an emergency.29
Local rules also prescribe procedure to be followed on a motion for TRO. Practitioners should consult DuPage County Circuit Court Rule 6.08 in actions involving motions for a TRO. The rule provides the procedures relating to filing, pleadings, notice and service of the injunction order. Cook County Circuit Court Rule 2.2 provides similar requirements.
V. Injunction Bond
Section 11-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the court has discretion to require a bond to secure payment of costs and damages incurred by person later found to have been wrongfully enjoined on either a TRO or preliminary injunction. Failure to require bond, however, does affect the enforceability of the TRO or injunction.30 Defense counsel should argue for a bond in an amount sufficient to secure payment of all damages that may accrue if the TRO is determined to have been wrongfully entered. Under Section 11-103, if the court requires a bond, the bond must be posted before the TRO or preliminary injunction order is entered. Plaintiff’s counsel may argue that defendant cannot be harmed by respecting plaintiff’s legal rights and maintaining the status quo until the parties’ respective rights can be resolved on the merits.
VI. The TRO Order
Section 11-101 requires every TRO or preliminary injunction order to set forth the reasons for its entry; to be specific in its terms; and to describe in reasonable detail, not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts to be restrained. The order must be self-contained and not refer to or incorporate by reference the complaint or another extrinsic document.31 Under Section 11-101, the order is binding upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, employees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
VII. Motion to Dissolve
Under Section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on 2 days’ notice to the party who obtained a temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter notice as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may move its dissolution or modification. Section 11-108 of the Code of Civil Procedure also provides that a motion to dissolve an injunction (with or without notice) may be made at any time before or after an answer is filed. Movant has the burden of proof and must establish an evidentiary basis in the record to support dissolving the TRO.32 Upon a motion to dissolve an injunction after an answer is filed, the court will hold a hearing and decide the motion upon the weight of the evidence.
VIII. Sanction for Violating a TRO
As is the case with violating most court orders, the sanction for violating a TRO is contempt.33 Therefore, counsel must ensure that the TRO is specific and understood by the parties.
IX. Appeals of Injunction Orders
Supreme Court Rule 307 governs interlocutory appeals as of right. Rule 307(a)(1) provides that an appeal of an order granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction shall be perfected within thirty days of the entry of the interlocutory order.
In 1989, Supreme Court Rule 307 was amended to add section (d) providing specific procedures for expedited appeals of orders relating to TROs. Thus, Rule 307(a)(1) generally governs appeals of orders relating to injunctions generally and Rule 307(d) relates specifically to TROs.34 Since the Supreme Court added section (d) in 1989, lower courts have examined the use of the different appeal provisions (and their different time requirements) in appeals of orders relating to TROs. Consistent with the apparent purpose of subsection (d) to provide a very expedited appeal of orders relating to TROs, courts have held that appeals of all orders relating to TROs, including motions to dissolve them, are to be filed and resolved under Rule 307(d).35 Therefore, all appeals of TROs and orders dissolving or refusing to dissolve TROs should comply with Rule 307(d). Appeals of orders regarding preliminary injunctions may take advantage of the more lenient time limits under rule 307(a)(1).
Under Rule 307(d), appeals from TROs and orders on motions to dissolve are brought by petition filed in Appellate Court, together with a notice of appeal filed in trial court. The Petition, and an appropriate supporting record authenticated by the Court Clerk or by counsel’s affidavit must be filed within two days of the entry or denial of the TRO. The Petition must state the relief requested and may be accompanied by a legal memorandum not to exceed fifteen pages.
Within two days after the petition is filed, the respondent may file a responding memorandum not to exceed fifteen pages. No replies are allowed.
Within two days after the time for respondent to file its memorandum has expired, without oral argument, the Appellate Court is to consider and decide the petition.
TROs and preliminary injunction proceedings give meaning to the term "fast track" litigation in dealing with legal emergencies. With meticulous attention to the rules and court procedures relating to them, counsel may use TROs and preliminary injunctions as legal tools in an emergency to preserve the status quo until the parties and court can resolve the controversy in due course.
1 Lyle R. Jager Agency, Inc. v. Steward, 253 Ill. App. 3d 631, 625 N.E.2d 397, 192 Ill. Dec. 437 (3rd Dist. 1993)(preliminary injunction granted, affirmed).
2 Village of Westmont v. Lenihan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 704 N.E.2d 891, 235 Ill. Dec. 318 (2nd Dist. 1998)(preliminary injunction granted, affirmed);
3 Vasquez v. City of Woodstock, 242 Ill. App. 3d 766, 611 N.E.2d 44, 183 Ill. Dec. 191 (2nd Dist. 1993)(TRO and preliminary injunction granted, affirmed);
4 Schweickart v. Powers, 245 Ill. App. 3d 281, 613 N.E.2d 403 184 Ill. Dec. 376 (2nd Dist. 1993)(preliminary injunction granted, affirmed).
5 TROs and preliminary injunctions may be available in a variety of cases. LSBZ, Inc. v. Brokis, 237 Ill. App. 3d 415, 603 N.E.2d 1240, 177 Ill. Dec. 866 (2nd Dist. 1992)(covenant not to compete, preliminary injunction granted, reversed); A.J. Dralle, Inc. v. Air Technologies, Inc., 255 Ill. App. 3d 982, 627 N.E.2d 690, 194 Ill. Dec 353 (2nd Dist. 1994)(covenant not to compete, preliminary injunction granted, reversed); C. D. Peters Construction Co. v. Tri-City Regional Port District, 281 Ill. App. 3d 41, 666 N.E.2d 44, 216 Ill. Dec. 876 (5th Dist. 1996)(public contract not awarded to low bidder, TRO granted, dissolved, order affirmed); Russell v. Howe, 293 Ill. App. 3d 293, 688 N.E.2d 375, 227 Ill. Dec. 894 (2nd Dist. 1997)(landlord locked out tenant, TRO granted, vacated, preliminary injunction denied, reversed); Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 284 Ill. App. 3d 848, 672 N.E.2d 763, 219 Ill. Dec. 910 (1st Dist. 1996)(land owner blocked access road, preliminary injunction granted, affirmed in part, modified).
6 Passon v. TCR, Inc., 242 Ill. App. 3d 259, 608 N.E.2d 1346, 181 Ill. Dec. 872 (2nd Dist. 1993); Harper v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 238, 636 N.E.2d 1192, 201 Ill. Dec. 760 (5th Dist. 1994) (a TRO is a quick, short term remedy to maintain status quo).
7 American Warehousing Services, Inc. v. Weitzman, 169 Ill. App. 3d 708, 533 N.E.2d 366, 127 Ill. Dec. 494 (1st Dist. 1988)(30 minutes notice by telephone); see Nagel v. Gerald Dennen & Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 5216, 650 N.E.2d 547, 208 Ill. Dec. 853 (1st Dist. 1995).
8 Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 156, 601 N.E.2d 720, 176 Ill. Dec. 22 (1992).
9 Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, 157 Ill. 2d 391, 626 N.E.2d 199, 193 Ill. Dec. 166 (1994); Buzz Barton & Associates, Inc. v. Giannone, 108 Ill. 2d 373, 483 N.E.2d 1271, 91 Ill. Dec. 636 (1985); Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 156, 601 N.E.2d 720, Ill. Dec. (1992); Schweickart v. Powers, 245 Ill. App. 3d 281, 613 N.E.2d 403, Ill. Dec. (2nd Dist. 1993); A.J. Dralle v. Air Technologies, Inc., 255 Ill. App. 3d 982, 990-91, 627 N.E.2d 690, 194 Ill. Dec. 353 (2nd Dist. 1994)(prima facie evidence of these factors is required); Lyle R. Jager Agency, Inc. v. Steward, 253 Ill. App. 3d 631, 625 N.E.2d 397, 192 Ill. Dec. 437 (3rd Dist. 1993); Scott v. Assurance Company of America, 253 Ill. App. 3d 813, 815, 625 N.E.2d 439, 192 Ill. Dec. 479 (4th Dist. 1994); Weitekamp v. Lane, 250 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 620 N.E.2d 454, 189 Ill. Dec. 486 (4th Dist. 1993); Jacob v. C & M Video, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 654, 618 N.E.2d 1267, 188 Ill. Dec. 697 (5th Dist. 1993); C.D. Peters Construction Co. v. Tri-City Regional Port District, 281 Ill. App. 3d 41, 45-46, 666 N.E.2d 44, 216 Ill. Dec. 876 (5th Dist. !996); Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 284 Ill. App. 3d 848, 672 N.E.2d 763, 219 Ill. Dec. 910 (1st Dist. 1996).
10 Buzz Barton & Associates, Inc. v. Giannone, 108 Ill. 2d 373, 483 N.E.2d 1271, 91 Ill. Dec. 636 (1985); Village of Westmont v. Lenihan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 704 N.E.2d 891, 235 Ill. Dec. 318 (2nd Dist. 1999); Hough v. Weber, 202 Ill. App. 3d 674, 560 N.E.2d 5, 147 Ill. Dec. 857 (2nd Dist. 1990).
11 Id.; Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 391, 626 N.E.2d 199, 193 Ill. Dec. 166 (1994); LSBZ, Inc. v. Brokis, 237 Ill. App. 3d 415, 603 N.E.2d 1240, 177 Ill. Dec. 866 (2nd Dist. 1992)
12 Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 391, 397-98, 626 N.E.2d 199, 193 Ill. Dec. 166 (1993)(preliminary injunction seeking relief on merits improper); Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission, 254 Ill. App. 3d 472, 627 N.E.2d 71, 193 Ill. Dec. 912 (1st Dist. 1993)(TRO mandated administrative hearing, reversed); Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 284 Ill. App. 3d 848, 672 N.E.2d 763, 219 ill. Dec. 910 (1st Dist. 1996) (preliminary injunction requiring removal of lock on gate across access road and providing unfettered access to road modified to reflect last actual peaceable status, prior to litigation).
13 Paddington Corp. v. Foremost Sales, Promotions, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 170, 175, 300 N.E.2d 484, Ill. Dec. (1st Dist. 1973)(TRO would be proper where defense counsel told court defendants refuse to maintain status quo).
14 Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Cullerton, 17 Ill. App. 3d 392, 308 N.E.2d 284, Ill. Dec. (1st Dist. 1974)(verified complaint or affidavits); Hough v. Weber, 202 Ill. App. 3d 674, 560 N.E.2d 5, 147 Ill. Dec. 857 (2nd Dist. 1990); County of Lake v. X-PO Security Police Services, Inc., 27 Ill. App. 3d 750, 327 N.E.2d 96, Ill. Dec. (2nd Dist. 1975).
15 Phelan v. Wright, 54 Ill. App. 2d 178, 203 N.E.2d 587 (1st Dist. 1964).
16 Mears v. Cohen Associates, Inc., 112 Ill. App. 3d 191, 445 N.E.2d 517, 68 Ill. Dec. 69 (1st Dist. 1983)(affidavit on information and belief insufficient).
17 People ex rel. Scott v. Aluminum Coil Anodizing Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 168, 268 N.E.2d 53 (2nd Dist. 1971).
18 242 Ill. App. 3d 259, 263, 608 N.E.2d 1346, 181 Ill. Dec. 872 (2nd Dist. 1993).
19 Id. at 263 citing Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 117 Ill. App. 3d 353, 355, 453 N.E.2d 740, 72 Ill. Dec. 865 (1st Dist. 1983).
20 Id. citing Lawter International, Inc. v. Carroll, 107 Ill. App. 3d 938, 939-40, 438 N.E.2d 590, 63 Ill. Dec. 659 (1st Dist. 1982); see Russell v. Howe, 293 Ill. App. 3d 293, 688 N.E.2d 375, Ill. Dec. (2nd Dist. 1997)(if defendant does not answer or respond to motion for preliminary injunction, the court need not hold a hearing because the sole question is whether the complaint is legally sufficient).
21 Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization, 34 Ill. 2d 257, 215 N.E.2d 443 (1966)("temporary injunction" may not be issued without evidentiary hearing where verified answer controverts material factual allegations).
22 13 Ill. App. 3d 170, 300 N.E.2d 484, Ill. Dec. (1st Dist. 1973)(also noting that Centennial Laundry preceded 1967 revisions to the Injunction Act).
23 Id. at 174.
24 Hough v. Weber, 202 Ill. App. 3d 674, 560 N.E.2d 5, 147 Ill. Dec. 857 (2nd Dist. 1990).
25 Nagel v. Gerald Dennen & Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 516, 520, 650 N.E.2d 547, 208 Ill. Dec. 853 (1st Dist. 1995).
26 C.D. Peters Construction Co. v. Tri-City Regional Port District, 281 Ill. App. 3d 41, 45-46, 666 N.E.2d 44, 216 Ill. Dec. 876 (5th Dist. 1996); Krebs v. Mini, 53 Ill. App. 3d 787, 368 N.E.2d 159, 10 Ill. Dec. 673 (2nd Dist. 1977)
27 Jacob v. C & M Video, Inc., 248 Ill. App. 3d 654, 618 N.E.2d 1267, 188 Ill. Dec. 697 (5th Dist. 1993).
28 Kable Printing Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinders Union, 63 Ill. 2d 514, 524, 349 N.E.2d 36 (1976); Jacob v. C & M Video, Inc., 248 Ill. App. 3d 654, 618 N.E.2d 1267, 188 Ill. Dec. 697 (5th Dist. 1993); Stanton v. City of Chicago, 177 Ill. App. 3d 519, 532 N.E.2d 464, 126 Ill. Dec. 779 (1st dist. 1988); Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 117 Ill. App. 3d 353, 453 N.E.2d 740, 72 Ill. Dec. 865 (1st Dist. 1983).
29 American Warehousing Services, Inc. v. Weitzman, 169 Ill. App. 3d 708, 533 N.E.2d 366, 127 Ill. Dec. 494 (1st Dist. 1988)(30 minutes notice by telephone); see Nagel v. Gerald Dennen & Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 5216, 650 N.E.2d 547, 208 Ill. Dec. 853 (1st Dist. 1995).
30 American Warehousing Services, Inc. v. Weitzman, 169 Ill. App. 3d 708, 533 N.E.2d 366, 127 Ill. Dec. 494 (1st Dist. 1988).
31 Howard Johnson & Co. v. Feinstein, 241 Ill. App. 3d 828, 838, 609 N.E.2d 930, 182 Ill. Dec. 396 (1st Dist. 1993).
32 City of Chicago v. Westphalen, 93 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1125, 418 N.E.2d 63, 49 Ill. Dec. 419 (1st Dist. 1981)
33 Board of Education of the Kankakee School District v. Kankakee Federation of Teachers, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d (1970); Board of Junior College District No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125, 49 Ill. Dec. 638 (1st Dist. 1970); Aurora Steel Products v. United Steel Workers of America, 94 Ill. App. 3d 97, 418 N.E.2d 492, 49 Ill. Dec. 638 (2nd Dist. 1981)
34 The standard of review on appeals under Rule 307 is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Village of Westmont v. Lenihan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1055, 704 N.E.2d 891, 235 Ill. Dec. 318 (2nd Dist.1999); North Pole Corp. v. Village of East Dundee, 263 Ill. App. 3d 327, 334, 635 N.E.2d 1060, 200 Ill. Dec. 721 (2nd Dist. 1994); A.J. Dralle v. Air Technologies, Inc., 255 Ill. App. 3d 982, 990-91, 627 N.E.2d 690, 194 Ill. Dec. 353 (2nd Dist. 1994); Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 284 Ill. App. 3d 848, 853, 672 N.E.2d 763, 219 Ill. Dec. 910 (1st Dist. 1996)(plaintiff must provide prima facie evidence to support claim); Lyle Jager Agency, Inc. v. Steward, 253 Ill. App. 3d 631, 625 N.E.2d 397, 192 Ill. Dec. 437 (3rd Dist. 1993); Scott v. Assurance Company of America, 253 Ill. App. 3d 813, 815, 625 N.E.2d 439, 192 Ill. Dec. 479 (4th Dist. 1994)(role of reviewing court is to determine whether the trial court=s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence).
35 Harper v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 238, 636 N.E.2d 1192, 201 Ill. Dec. 760 (2nd Dist. 1994)(Rule 307(d) applies to appeals of all orders relating to TROs); Friedman v. Thorson, 303 Ill. App. 3d 131, 707 N.E.2d 624, 236 Ill. Dec. 497 (1st Dist. 1999).
Michael D. McCormick is a new member of the DCBA and concentrates in commercial and insurance litigation and chancery matters. He graduated from Northwestern University in 1975 with a Bachelor of Arts degree and earned his J.D. from Loyola University Chicago in 1978.