By Christopher S. Carroll and William Knee

Following are summaries of four recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions. Two of the summaries relate to criminal cases and two of the summaries relate to civil cases.

People v. Walker. June 4, 2004 (By Justice McMorrow).

Trial court committed reversible error when it admitted evidence of the name and nature of defendant’s prior felony conviction rather than accept defendant’s offer to stipulate to his felon status. Averell A. Walker was tried on the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Prior to trial, defense counsel made an oral motion to stipulate that defendant had a prior felony conviction. The State rejected the offer to stipulate on the ground that defendant’s felon status was an element of the charged offense. The primary issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of the name and nature of defendant’s prior conviction when a stipulation was available. The statute under which the defendant was charged was possession of a weapon by a felon, which did not require proof of a specific felony conviction. Thus, to prove a violation of the statute under which defendant was charged, the prosecution need only establish the defendant’s status as a convicted felon, not the specific nature of the crime. When a defendant offers to stipulate to his felon status, the prosecution has available to it evidence which is equally probative of the prior-conviction element of the crime charged as the record of conviction would be. Illinois courts have long recognized, as a matter of common law, that a trial court may exercise its discretion to exclude evidence, even when it is relevant, if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. When deciding whether to exclude certain evidence, the proper consideration is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. When applying this balancing test in the context of cases requiring proof of felon status, the admission of a defendant’s record of conviction creates a risk that he will be unfairly prejudiced. Moreover, because the only purpose for admitting a defendant’s prior-conviction record is to establish felon status, the name and nature of the prior conviction is unnecessary surplus without any evidentiary significance. On the other hand, the defendant’s admission or stipulation is conclusive evidence of felon status, which presents little or no risk of unfair prejudice. Therefore, when an admission or stipulation of felon status is offered by the defendant, the probative value of the record of conviction is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and the trial court should require the prosecution to meet its evidentiary burden by using the admission or stipulation of felon status.

People V. Tremain Funches. (By Justice Freeman)

The statutory inference that a person who exercises exclusive, unexplained possession of a stolen vehicle has knowledge that the vehicle is stolen, does not violate Due Process. In Tremain, defendant entered a drug store purportedly to make a purchase, but while the sales clerk was distracted, snatched a bag containing over $300 in cash. The store owner chased defendant from the store. In flight, defendant encountered an automobile parked in a driveway with the engine running. The defendant jumped into the running car and, while attempting to speed from the scene, struck the store owner who was in pursuit. Police officers were alerted, and en route to the store, they observed the stolen automobile. The police officers activated their lights and sirens. Instead of stopping, defendant engaged in a dangerous, high-speed flight from police which ended when he wrecked the car at the end of a dead-end street. Defendant was taken into custody and charged with theft of the money, theft of the automobile, attempted first degree murder of the store owner, and aggravated unlawful failure to obey a peace officer’s order to stop. Section 4-103.2(a)(7)(A) of the Vehicle Code prohibits the driver or operator of a vehicle who is not entitled to the possession of that vehicle, and who knows the vehicle is stolen or converted, and "who has been given a signal by a peace officer directing the driver to stop the vehicle, from willfully failing or refusing to obey such direction, or to flee or attempt to elude to the signaling officer. This statute contains a permissive inference that a person who exercises the exclusive unexplained possession of a stolen vehicle has knowledge that the vehicle is stolen, regardless of whether the date when the vehicle was stolen is recent or remote. Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss this charge and the trial judge granted the motion reasoning that the permissive inference of knowledge that the vehicle was stolen violates due process by removing the requirement that the vehicle be recently stolen in order for possession of it to support an inference that the possessor knew that the vehicle was stolen, relying on People V. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d 420. The Illinois High Court reversed. In its analysis, the Court first reviewed inferences in evidence law. An inference is a factual conclusion that can rationally be drawn by considering other facts. Thus, an inference is merely a deduction that the fact finder may draw in its discretion, but is not required to draw as a matter of law. In a criminal prosecution, however, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the defendant against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. Therefore, an evidentiary device, such as an inference, must not undermine the fact finder’s responsibility at trial, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence adduced by the State. The Court concluded, an inference does not violate due process guarantees where three conditions are satisfied: (1) there must be a rational connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact; (2) the presumed fact must be more likely than not to flow from the basic fact; and (3) the inference must be supported by corroborating evidence of guilt. If there is no corroborating evidence, the leap from the basic fact to the presumed element must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that the defendant would have to show the applicability of these factors to his case, and then rather dryly noted that the defendant could not show the lack of a rational connection between the proven fact (possession and operation of a stolen automobile) and the inference of knowledge that the car was stolen since here the defendant had jumped into somebody else’s car and gave flight.

St. Clair County v. Kathryn Phillips et al. October 21, 2004 (By Justice Garman)

In an appeal brought by owners of properties sought to be demolished by the County of St. Clair, the issue before the court was whether Section 5-1121 of the Counties Code, (which allows demolition of property without allowing property owners to repair the property after findings of an unsafe condition), constitutes an unconstitutional taking without due process and without just compensation. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County for further proceedings in light of its holding in Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 334 Ill. App. 3d 488 (2002), which held that Section 11-31-1 of the Municipal Code is constitutional, in that the demolition provision in the statute is rationally related to the public interest in health and safety.

In Re D.T., A Minor, People of the State of Illinois v. Brenda T. October 21, 2004.

(By Justice Fizgerald).