By Steven R. Merican

Following are summaries of selected opinions recently issued by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 2003 Ill. Lexis 1493, Docket No. 94814 (10/17/03). Amendments to the Consumer Fraud Act that favor car dealers are unconstitutional special legislation. Unhappy with his purchase of a used car, Charles Allen sued Woodfield Chevrolet. He alleged that Woodfield charged a price for the car different from the one advertised. He also asked for a declaration that certain aspects of the Consumer Fraud Act, that applied only to auto dealers, were unconstitutional special legislation.

Certain amendments to the Consumer Fraud Act, passed in the 1990s, pertained only to purchases of cars from dealers. The amendments accomplished a few things: added a 30-day presuit notice filing requirement; added an offer of judgment provision that allowed prejudgment interest if the prevailing party did not beat the settlement offer at trial; required consumers to plead "a public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers and the public interest generally"; disallowed attorney fees to the consumer if the recovery at trial is less than the offer of judgment; required proof that the dealer’s conduct was "willful or intentional and done with evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others" to get punitive damages.

The court used a two-pronged analysis for constitutionality. "We must determine first whether the statutory amendments discriminate in favor of a select group and, if so, whether the classification created by the statutory amendments is arbitrary.

The court stated that the amendments "discourage consumers defrauded by vehicle dealers from pursuing claims . . . by making it more burdensome for consumers to do so." On this basis, the court had no trouble concluding that "the amendments plainly favor new and used vehicle dealers."

The court also ruled that the amendments were arbitrary. The court reviewed legislative history, which showed that the amendments were passed to "address the problem posed by an ‘aggressive group of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ who ‘churn’ consumer fraud cases against vehicle dealers, i.e., who pursue small claims without a good-faith basis in order to ‘ring up’ attorney fees recoverable under the Act. . . ." However, the court rejected the arguments that the amendments acted as a disincentive to filing frivolous claims. The court was more concerned that legitimate consumer complaints would be deterred or that consumers would risk the loss of rights that the Consumer Fraud Act grants to plaintiffs who sue anyone other than a car dealer.

The supreme court held that the "car dealer" amendments to the Consumer Fraud Act therefore were impermissible special legislation under Article IV § 13 of the Illinois Constitution.

In re Estate of Poole, 2003 Ill. Lexis 1492, Docket No. 93872 (10/17/03). Father of stillborn illegitimate child must prove parentage pursuant to the Parentage Act to take precedence as administrator of child’s estate. Randy Poole and Christina Kay Clausen lived together and were going to have a baby. But Christina died in a car accident. She was survived by her baby, Madison, who ultimately was stillborn by Caesarian section. Christina’s mother, Debra Jean Clausen, was the administrator of Madison’s estate. Money came into the estate through a settlement with Christina’s insurer by way of a claim for uninsured-motorist benefits. Debra Jean sought court approval to execute the settlement and to distribute the settlement money to the heirs, which did not include Poole. Poole filed a petition to revoke Debra Jean’s Letters of Administration. He claimed that as father, he had precedence over Debra Jean to act as administrator.

The supreme court ruled that the order of preference for administration of the estate was governed by the Madison’s parentage, and that a determination of parentage was governed by the Parentage Act. In this case, to establish parentage, the Parentage Act required Poole to bring an action by verified complaint. The court remanded to the trial court to allow Poole the opportunity to do so.

The supreme court ruled that if Poole can establish that he is the father "he would, pursuant to section 9-3 [of the Probate Act] take precedence over Clausen for the administering of letters of the estate . . ."

Clausen had argued that Poole could not in any event inherit anything from Madison’s estate because Poole was not an "eligible parent" under the Probate Act. She argued that Poole could not be an "eligible parent" because Madison never lived. Because he never lived, Clausen maintained, Poole could not establish himself as an eligible parent "during the decedent’s lifetime," as is required by the Probate Act. Clausen’s argument would prevent all fathers of illegitimate fetuses from inheriting from their estates.

While this question technically was not before the court, it did "comment on the issue." The court observed that Illinois law allows parents to recover for the wrongful death of a fetus. The court stated: "We do not believe that the legislature intended section 2-2 [of the Probate Act] to have the blanket effect of debarring all illegitimate fathers from recovering for the wrongful deaths of their stillborn children. We read section 2-2 simply as a method of insuring that such fathers must prove that they are parents in more than the genetic sense, i.e., that they are ‘eligible,’ before they can take under the line of intestate distribution."

People v. McCoy, 2003 Ill. Lexis 1496, Docket No. 90364 (10/17/03). Inconsistent verdict in a bench trial is not a basis to vacate the conviction. Defendant broke into the victim’s bedroom, covered her head with a pillow, beat her, and sexually assaulted her. In a bench trial, he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, but found not guilty of unlawful restraint. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years.

McCoy appealed, arguing that his conviction for aggravated sexual assault was inconsistent with his acquittal for unlawful restraint. Both the appellate and supreme courts affirmed the conviction.

Earlier this year, the supreme court ruled that an inconsistent verdict was not a legitimate basis upon which to challenge a jury conviction. (People v. Jones, 2003 Ill. Lexis 782, No. 93511 (5/22/03), overruling People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270 (1996).) The court stated that there was even less reason to vacate an inconsistent verdict in a bench trial than in a jury trial. Following its recent opinion in Jones, the court stated: "Though we do not encourage trial judges to stray from their duty to follow the law, we do acknowledge, without condoning, the clear reality that trial judges may exercise lenity in what they perceive as the interests of justice. Thus, we do not reject an inconsistent verdict rendered in a bench trial as unreliable and suggestive of confusion."

People v. Johnson, 2003 Ill. Lexis 1497, Docket Nos. 90678, 90693, 90706 (10/17/03). Coalescence of unduly prejudicial evidence and improper argument directed at the sympathies and outrage of the jury requires new trial for defendants. These consolidated cases consider the extent to which prosecutorial misconduct in presenting evidence and closing argument will require a new trial for defendants, or even cause reversal of a conviction.

The supreme court closely reviewed three convictions, and upheld two appellate court reversals and reversed the other. The basis of the reversals was: ". . . [C]umulative error and a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice that denied defendant a fair trial and cast doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process . . . We note that the prejudice in this case . . . was engendered in the main by prosecutorial misconduct . . . [T]he coalescence of improper, emotion-laden evidence, and inflammatory argument obviously designed to exploit that evidence, created a synergism of parallel errors."

Some of the evidentiary errors were:

• The "bloodied and brain-splattered uniform" of the police officer/victim "was displayed on a life-size, headless mannequin, which was later taken into the jury room during deliberations."

• The victim’s father’s testimony about personal family matters. The court ruled that this testimony "served on one purpose, namely, to highlight the poignancy of the . . . family’s loss and to suggest to the jury that the family’s pain could be alleviated by a guilty verdict."

• A police commander’s testimony about the oath of office sworn by the officer/victim was read to the jury, and about his badge being retired and displayed at the "honored starcase" at headquarters. The court ruled that this testimony was "irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence" and intensified the "State’s ‘markedly prejudicial’ closing."

The court reviewed comments by the prosecution during closing argument, and concluded: "There is no mistaking that much of the argument was aimed directly at the sympathies of the jury or was intended to evoke outrage." Many of these comments concerned the victim’s tribulations during the incident, and contrasted the victim and the defendant. The court ruled that this tactic was improper because it was intended to arouse the sympathies and outrage of the jury.

The supreme court also stated that the prosecution’s arguments that a guilty verdict would speak to the problems of crime in society should not be the focus of a jury considering the guilt or innocence of an individual defendant, "lest the remediation of society’s problems distract jurors from the awesome responsibility with which they are engaged."

The court also criticized the manner in which the prosecution tried to meld the send-a-message and the crime-in-society arguments. "[T]he exhortation to ‘send a message’ was exacerbated by the prosecutor’s attempt to identify and merge his position, on some irrelevant and ethereal level, with the jury, the society, and the community."

The supreme court was concerned about a widespread problem of prosecutorial misconduct – i.e., use of such trial tactics that the court here ruled were improper. The court threatened that continued prosecutorial misconduct could result in reversal of convictions. "Misconduct on the part of prosecutors cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. To call it ‘error’ is to mischaracterize it, as it represents nothing less than an attempt to subvert a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial. Multiple instances of this kind of conduct in the course of a criminal trial threaten the trustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process . . . and this court will take corrective action to preserve the integrity of the process . . . We mean it as no hollow warning when we say that prosecutors risk reversal of otherwise proper convictions when they engage in conduct of this kind."