Eychaner v. Gross, 2002 Ill. Lexis 936, Docket No. 91496 (10/3/02). University did not create an express trust for the Auditorium Theater. This case arises from the dispute over control of the famous Auditorium Theater in Chicago. The theater has been owned by Roosevelt University since 1947. In 1960, Roosevelt created the Auditorium Theater Council, a group that was given the responsibility of management, programming, and operation of the theater and of carrying out the details of a fund-raising campaign. Turf disputes between the university and the council began to surface in the late 1980s. This lawsuit followed the council’s objection to Roosevelt’s desire to transfer $1.5 million from the theater’s operating account to Roosevelt’s general account. The council sued to prevent the transfer and asked the court to declare that Roosevelt had placed the theater in the public domain for the benefit of the people of Chicagoland. The council asked for a declaration that it was trustee of the theater.

The question of whether Roosevelt had placed the theater in trust, thus giving control to the purported trustee (the council), turned primarily on the nuances of the university’s 1960 resolution that created the council. The supreme court did a detailed review of the evidence and ruled: "The 1960 resolution lacks the other indicia that are consistent with charitable trusts." The resolution did not contain "any provision directing a delivery of property or an interest in property." Nor did the resolution state a charitable or public purpose, nor any purpose to "confer benefits through the medium of a trust." Roosevelt had given the council broad day-to-day authority to conduct its responsibilities. But the court ruled that the council’s responsibilities did not govern the issue. Rather, the dispositive question was "whether Roosevelt retained the right to exercise control if that ever became necessary."

People v. City of Chicago, 2002 Ill. Lexis 939, Docket No. 93978 (10/18/02). IDOT’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute was reasonable, and therefore the City of Chicago could proceed with construction at O’Hare Airport because the improvements did not require IDOT’s certification. This lawsuit was filed in 1995 by the DuPage County State’s Attorney to prevent Chicago from proceeding with construction of certain improvements at O’Hare Airport because the city did not get certification from IDOT. The State’s Attorney argued that the Illinois Aeronautics Act required IDOT certification. The city argued that the construction — which primarily had to do with terminal and ground transportation improvements — did not fall within IDOT’s governance, per IDOT’s own interpretation of the Act, and that the construction therefore did not violate the Act.

The court ruled that the was ambiguous. "Because strict application of the phrase ‘any alteration or extension of an existing airport’ leads to patently absurd results, and because nothing in section 47 narrows the reach of the phrase, we are compelled to look beyond section 47 for assistance in construing this statute’s scope."

Thus, the court reviewed a regulation issued by IDOT in 1985. That regulation required certification only for alterations or extensions that materially alter runway size or layout or that interfere with or otherwise obstruct an approach slope transition slope or turning zone. The court ruled that the terminal and ground transportation improvements that the city was doing at that time did not fall under IDOT’s regulation, so certification was not necessary. The court rejected the argument that the city was trying to evade IDOT scrutiny by doing construction piece meal. The court stated "nothing that the City undertakes in anticipation of new or expanded runways can relieve the City of its obligation to obtain IDOT certification for the construction of new or expanded runways."

People v. Klaeren, 2002 Ill. Lexis 941, Docket No. 90537 (10/18/02). In a public hearing for a special use permit, due process requires that interested parties be afforded the right to cross-examine witnesses. There was citizen opposition to construction of a Meijer department store being built in Lisle. The Village conducted a joint hearing at which a proposed annexation, special use, and rezoning petition were determined. The village mayor, who ran the public hearing, did not allow the citizens to cross-examine the Meijer witnesses. The plan commission and the zoning board recommended denial of the project, but by an extraordinary majority the Village approved it. Plaintiffs, residents of the village whose properties are next to the proposed development, sued for an injunction to prevent the construction of the store.

The residents complained that the mayor denied them due process by his decision not to allow cross-examination. The decision turned on an interpretation of Illinois Municipal Code, which grants only notice and an opportunity to be heard at a public hearing concerning a special use. Plaintiffs argued that the right to cross-examine witnesses is implied in the requirement of a public hearing. The court agreed, and ruled that precluding cross-examination was a denial of due process. The court ruled that municipal bodies act in administrative or quasi-judicial capacities when they conduct zoning hearings concerning special use petitions. "In these hearings, the property rights of the interested parties are at issue . . . As a result, those parties must be afforded the due process rights normally granted to individuals whose property rights are at stake."

Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 2002 Ill. Lexis 940, Docket No. 92162 (10/18/02). In a nonjury case, a motion to reconsider the judgment does not require any detail in order to toll the time by which a notice of appeal must be filed under Rule 303. In a real estate brokerage commission dispute, defendants prevailed on a summary judgment motion. Plaintiff timely filed a motion to reconsider under Section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the motion merely asked for reconsideration of the judgment. It did not state a basis for the request or cite any facts or legal authority. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal within the deadline set by Supreme Court Rule 303, but more than 30 days since the original judgment had elapsed. Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the motion for reconsideration was a pretext to gain extra time to file an appeal. The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the motion was insufficient under the Code and the supreme court rules.

The supreme court reversed. The court stated that neither the code nor the rules require specificity in a motion to reconsider a nonjury judgment. The court refused to require that a 2-1203 motion contain any specificity. "We decline to hold that post-judgment motions in nonjury cases must contain some undefined degree of detail, lest the filer risk that the reviewing court hold that the motion is not a motion at all. It is not clear that a nonspecific motion could not fulfill its role, and there is no reason to require the filer to guess how much detail is enough."