By Steven R. Merican

Following are summaries of selected opinions recently issued by the Illinois Supreme Court:

Dawdy v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2003 Ill. Lexis 1418, Docket No. 93710 (8/21/03). Forum non conveniens motion should be granted, even to transfer to an adjoining county, where private and public interests weigh in favor of transfer. While driving his tractor in Macoupin County, plaintiff collided with a truck owned and being operated by Union Pacific Railroad. Plaintiff was seriously injured in the accident, and sued in nearby Madison County. Union Pacific filed a motion to transfer venue to Macuopin County. The circuit court denied the motion, and the appellate court, on a motion for rehearing, affirmed. The supreme court reversed, and set out the test for assessing the propriety of forum non conveniens motion. "A court must balance the private and public interests in determining the appropriate forum in which the case should be tried."

The private interests favored transfer because: (1) The location of the witnesses generally was closer to Macoupin County than to Madison County; (2) Macoupin County was the location of the accident, making the possibility of the jury viewing the site easier. The court rejected "the contention that trial in an adjacent county is conclusively not inconvenient for a defendant." And the court gave "little weight" to the fact that plaintiff’s attorneys have an office in Madison County, and that defendant’s lawyers are in an adjacent county.

The supreme court also ruled that the public interest factors greatly favored a Macoupin County venue. The court was chiefly concerned that the case be litigated in the county with the greatest local interest in the dispute. "Most significantly, the fact that the accident occurred in Macoupin County gives the action a local interest." The court was concerned that "the residents of Madison County should not be burdened with jury duty given the fact that the action did not arise in, and has no relation to, their county."

The court acknowledged plaintiff’s right to choose the forum, but ruled that "the deference to plaintiff’s choice of Madison County is reduced because he does reside there and the action did not arise there." The court held that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant the motion to transfer.

People v. Bunch, 2003 Lexis 1419, Docket No. 93472 (8/21/03). Detaining passenger of car, from which driver already was arrested, to identify himself was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and rendered passenger’s subsequent drug possession arrest unconstitutional. Defendant was a passenger in a car that was pulled over because its brake lights did not function. The driver was arrested because he did not have a driver’s license. After that arrest, the police officer approached the passenger and asked him to exit the car. The passenger did so, and a short conversation ensued. The officer twice shined his flashlight in defendant’s face and asked him to identify himself and, "Where you coming from?" Defendant asked why the driver had been arrested.

During the conversation, the officer saw "a small, clear plastic item, containing something white, in defendant’s mouth." Defendant was arrested, and a subsequent search of the car turned up two similar plastic bags. The white substance was heroin.

Defendant moved to quash the arrest and to suppress the evidence. During the bench trial, the circuit court denied the motions. Defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to four years in prison. The appellate court reversed the conviction because defendant was unlawfully detained, and the evidence that flowed from that unlawful detention, including the bags of heroin, had to be suppressed.

The supreme court affirmed the reversal of the conviction. The court assessed defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights using the Terry-stop standards: (1) whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception; (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. The court ruled that the officer’s conduct fell outside the Terry boundaries. "We note first that the questions the officer put to defendant (‘What’s your name? Where you [sic] coming from?’ were not related to the purpose of the stop – operating a vehicle without brake lights." The court also ruled that because the officer’s questions to defendant occurred after the driver was arrested, "it prolonged defendant’s detention beyond the completion of the purpose of the stop," and thus changed the fundamental nature of the stop. The court ruled that the officer’s conduct was an exercise of authority that impermissibly detained the defendant. "Given these circumstances, we conclude that the officer’s actions constituted a show of authority such that a reasonable person would conclude that he or she was not free to leave."

Rex road v. City of Springfield, 2003 Ill. Lexis 1417, Docket No. 94374 (8/ 21/03). Tort Immunity Act does not immunize city from liability for negligence in repairing a school parking lot that happens to be adjacent to the school football field. Matthew Rexroad was manager for the high school football team. While retrieving a helmet from the school, he walked across a parking lot that was between the school and the football field. The lot was being repaired by the city. Matthew fell in a hole in and broke his ankle. He sued the city for negligence in creating the hole.

The city claimed it was immune from suit under the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. The Act immunizes local governments from lawsuits "where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes…"

But the supreme court held that the Act did not provide immunity. The parking lot was used generally for the entire school, not just for football games and other recreational activities. The court was concerned that granting immunity in this case "would effectively immuniz[e] large amounts of otherwise nonrecreational school property simply because it is located near recreational school property."

People v. Lee, 2003 Ill. Lexis 1420, Docket No. 93221, 93363 (8/21/03). Defendant cannot raise his Apprendi claim in a successive post-conviction petition. In 1988, defendant was convicted of murder. The circuit court found that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, so defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 80 years. Seven years later, defendant filed a post-conviction petition. That petition was dismissed as untimely. In August 2000, defendant filed another post-conviction petition. This time he argued that the extended term was unconstitutional because it was not based on a finding by beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Thus, defendant argued, the extended sentence ordered in 1988 violated the United States Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

The Illinois Supreme Court held that defendant’s petition should be dismissed. Successive petitions under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act are prohibited. But there is an exception to the rule – where fundamental fairness requires that a successive petition be allowed. To establish fundamental fairness, defendant must show cause and prejudice with respect to the claims in the petition. "Cause" means "some objective factor external to the defense that impeded counsel’s efforts to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding. "Prejudice" is "an error which so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process."

The supreme court ruled that defendant could not show prejudice. "Defendant’s extended-term sentence would be invalid, and defendant would suffer prejudice only if the rule announced in Apprendi applied retroactively to the sentencing proceedings conducted in 1988. However, we recently held … that ‘Apprendi does not apply retroactively to causes in which the direct appeal process had concluded at the time that Apprendi was decided.’ … Defendant therefore cannot establish prejudice in this case."