Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 2002 Ill. Lexis 289, Docket No. 90340 (Sup. Ct. 3/25/02). (1) Limitations provision in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act is not jurisdictional. (2) Each alleged wrongful allocation of autos by the distributor over a 10-year period was a separate violation of the Act, not one, continuing violation. Plaintiff, an automobile retailer, sued the distributor for not allocating enough cars pursuant to a franchise agreement. The misallocation occurred over a period of more than 10 years. A jury trial ended in a substantial verdict for plaintiff. The Motor Vehicle Franchise Act contains a four-year limitations period. The distributor argued that compliance with the "built-in" limitations period "is an element of the plaintiff’s case and a jurisdictional prerequisite to the plaintiff’s right to sue."

This opinion contains extensive discussion of the nature of the court’s jurisdiction, and the impact on jurisdiction that amendments to the Illinois Constitution in 1964 (carried into the 1970 Constitution) made. The court stated that the 1964 amendments limited the general assembly’s ability to legislate jurisdiction to administrative review matters. The court concluded that the limitations period in the Act was the same as any ordinary statute of limitations – a defense, not an element of plaintiff’s cause of action.

To overcome the four-year limitations period, plaintiff argued that the series of wrongful allocations constituted one continuing wrong. The court rejected this argument, and stated: "Although we recognize that the allocations were repeated, we cannot conclude that defendants’ conduct somehow constituted one, continuing, unbroken, decade-long violation of the Act. Rather, each allocation constituted a separate violation of section 4 of the Act, each violation supporting a separate cause of action."

The court ruled that the pharmacy had a duty to warn that the prescribed medication was contraindicated. The court focused on two undisputed facts: that the pharmacy was aware of plaintiff’s drug allergies; the pharmacy knew that Toradol should not be given to people who are allergic to aspirin. "Both the likelihood and the reasonable foreseeability of injury here were great. These factors thus favor the imposition of a duty on Wal-Mart."

The court rejected the argument that the learned intermediary doctrine precluded a duty to warn. The court distinguished this situation from one where the pharmacist might be called upon to render medical advice, such as informing a patient about a possibly excessive prescription. In this case, the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply because a medical judgment was not required simply to notify the physician or the patient about the contraindication.

Daniels v. Industrial Commission, 2002 Ill. Lexis 293, Docket No. 90318 (Sup. Ct. 3/21/02). Decision rendered by Industrial Commission panel that was not legally constituted is void. Plaintiff, who was injured on the job, brought an action in the Industrial Commission. The Commission reduced an award entered by the arbitrator. However, two of the members of the Commission panel were appointed by the commission chair, not the governor as is required by statute. The court stated that there was no statutory authority for the commission chair to appoint panel members to vacant positions, and concluded: "Where an administrative agency acts outside its specific statutory authority, as the Commission did when it appointed Kane and Reichart, it acts without jurisdiction. Its actions are void, a nullity from their inception."

This case provoked a concurrence and a dissent that focused on whether the argument that the commission’s ruling was a nullity had been waived. Plaintiff did not dispute the qualifications of the challenged commission members until the case was on appeal. The majority, supported by the special concurrence, ruled that there was no waiver of the argument, even though it was not raised before the commission or in the circuit court. The court stated: "That, however, is of no consequence. Because agency action for which there is no statutory authority is void, it is subject to attack at any time in any court, either directly or collaterally."

In re C.W., 2002 Ill. Lexis 297, Docket No. 90738 (Sup. Ct. 3/21/02). Parent cannot be unfit under the Adoption Act based on evidence of failure to protect during a time that the child is in foster care. However, evidence that gave rise to removal of child into foster care can also be used as a basis for unfitness. Mother found to be an unfit parent under the Adoption Act for failing to protect her daughter and son from physical abuse at home. The DCFS placed the children in a foster home. Two years later, the State filed petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The circuit court terminated the mother’s rights, and the appellate court affirmed. Also affirming, the supreme court analyzed the admissibility of certain evidence in a fitness hearing under the Adoption Act.

The State argued that the mother was an unfit parent because, after the children were placed in a foster home, the mother continued to live under conditions that were potentially injurious to the children. The court ruled that under the clear and unambiguous language of the Adoption Act, "a parent cannot be found unfit based on a ‘failure to protect’ during the period the child is in foster care."

The mother had offered evidence that she had successfully completed offered parenting services. However, the supreme court ruled that the finding of unfitness could be based upon the same evidence that was the basis of the removal of the children from the mother’s home; the successful completion of parenting services did not necessarily clear the original problem. "[E]vidence that a parent substantially completed offered services, or otherwise refrained from prior objectionable conduct following removal of the child, does not somehow absolve or erase the parent’s initial failing that triggered State intervention and removal of the child."