DCBA - Recent Case Law

Recent Case Law

By Steven R. Merican

Here are a few recent cases of importance and note - March 2004.

Following are summaries of selected opinions recently issued by the Illinois Supreme Court:

Weiss v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc., 2004 Ill. Lexis 1, Docket No. 95458 (1/23/04). (1) Rulings on defendant’s motion strike class allegations and to compel plaintiff to arbitration were appealable. (2) "Successful adjudication" test does not apply to a class action complaint that is being challenged on a motion to dismiss. Sufficient for class action complaint to state facts sufficient to conclude the possible existence of a class claim.

Plaintiff opened a brokerage account with defendant. Defendant promised to give plaintiff access to his account and to make the account accessible for trading around the clock. Plaintiff claimed that defendant failed to provide timely access to the account, causing plaintiff to incur losses in the market. He also claimed that there were many others in the same situation, so he brought his lawsuit as a class action.

Waterhouse made a motion to strike the class allegations and, based upon the account agreement, to force arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim. The circuit court denied the motion to strike and to compel arbitration. Waterhouse appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1), which allows interlocutory appeals of orders denying injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration, but ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion to strike.

Waterhouse appealed to the supreme court. The petition for leave to appeal was denied, but the supreme court vacated the appellate court’s order and directed the appellate court to reconsider "the propriety of the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to strike class action allegations." The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to strike and reversed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration as being premature.

Waterhouse appealed again. This time the supreme court took the case. The court ruled that there was appellate jurisdiction over the order denying of the motion to strike, even though it normally is an unappealable interlocutory order. The supreme court stated that its earlier supervisory order directing the appellate court to review that order in effect conferred appellate jurisdiction. "Our earlier decision is now the law of the case."

The supreme court also stated that jurisdiction was appropriate because the motion to strike and the motion to compel were intertwined. "That is, the validity of any order on the motion to strike class allegations determined the validity of any order on the motion to compel arbitration, and the order denying the motion to compel arbitration was appealable under Rule 307(a)(1)."

On the substance of the motion to strike, the court ruled that the complaint stated sufficient facts to survive. The dispute centered on whether plaintiff’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the "successful adjudication" test to certify a class. The "successful adjudication" test probes whether common questions predominate among the class members, and asks whether "the successful adjudication of the plaintiffs’ claim will establish a right to recovery in the class members’."

The court rejected use of the "successful adjudication" test for determining motions to strike class allegations. The court distinguished between motions to strike class allegations and motions to certify a class. "The showing that Weiss must make in seeking class certification is correspondingly higher than the showing he must make to withstand a motion to strike class allegations. Unlike the class action prerequisites at certification, here they are not a matter of proof, but a matter of pleading."

The court defined a rule for alleging class allegations under section 1-801 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "The plaintiff’s complaint simply must contain allegations which implicate or bring the complaint within, these prerequisites. It is enough that the factual allegations are sufficiently broad in scope to plead the possible existence of a class action claim under section 801." The court affirmed the ruling that the possibility Weiss can maintain the class allegations "cannot be ruled out."

Williams v. Staples, 2004 Ill. Lexis 2, Docket No. 95873 (1/23/04). Term of conditional release of a party who was not guilty by reason of insanity, and who is in custody of the Department of Mental Health, cannot reach beyond the time he would have been incarcerated had he been found guilty.

In the original criminal proceeding, Williams was charged with first degree murder. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and involuntarily committed to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. Section 5-2-4(b) of the Corrections Code states that the maximum period of time that a defendant may be involuntarily committed cannot exceed the maximum length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve had he been convicted. The date that the involuntary commitment must end is known as the "Thiem" date. In this case, Williams’s Thiem date was in September 2001, so he could not be involuntarily committed beyond that time.

In December 2000, Williams was given a five-year conditional release. After September 2001, but before the five-year conditional release expired, Williams tested positive for cocaine, a violation of a condition of his release. The State petitioned to revoke the conditional release. While that petition was pending, Williams again tested positive for cocaine. The circuit court issued a contempt citation and a warrant for Williams’s arrest.

At the contempt hearing, Williams argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over him because his Thiem date had expired. After he was evaluated, Williams was given inpatient treatment, but he was not involuntarily committed. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled to an immediate release because the circuit court could not confine him past his September 2001 Theime date. The supreme court agreed.

The State argued that section 5-2-4(1)(D) of the Corrections Code mandated that a defendant who was not guilty by reason of insanity be placed on conditional release for five years. The State contended that because Williams was conditionally released prior to his Thiem date, Williams’s Thiem date became irrelevant because he was no longer confined.

The supreme court acknowledged the ambiguity created between sections 5-2-4(b) and 5-2-4(1)(D) of the Corrections Code. The court analyzed the legislative history of the statute and concluded that, "[I]t is evident that the legislature did not intend for the conditional release period to be used to allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over an NGRI [not guilty by reason of insanity] defendant beyond the expiration of his Thiem date."

The court ruled that the Code’s conditional release provision was not even directed at NGRI defendants who were involuntarily committed. "Rather, the conditional release provision was added to address the situation where defendants were found not guilty by reason of insanity and then released because they were not in need of mental treatment or did not meet the standard for involuntary admission. Prior to the adoption of House Bill 1010, those defendants were simply released without any supervision." The conditional release provision in the Code allows "the courts to impose conditions upon those defendants for a period of five years, and to allow the court to recommit that person if he violated the conditions of his release."

Vitro v. Mihelcic, 2004 Ill. Lexis 8, Docket No. 94231 (1/23/04). Supreme Court reaffirms rule that parents’ loss of society for a non-fatally injured child is not compensable.

Dorothy Vitro was born with severe brain damage. Her parents sued Defendant Dr. Mihelcic for negligently managing Dorothy’s birth, and thus causing the brain damage. Count III of the parents’ complaint alleged loss of filial consortium with Dorothy, and sought damages for the disruption of the family relationship.

A loss of consortium claim on behalf of parents is valid in a wrongful-death action. However, in 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, and held that there is no cause of action for loss of consortium with a child who is not fatally injured. In this case, the Vitros asked the supreme court to overrule Dralle and to allow their action for loss of consortium.

In a 4-3 decision, the court reaffirmed Dralle and declined to "enlarge the scope of liability to encompass claims for loss of filial society resulting from nonfatal injuries to a child." The court found much of Dralle’s reasoning to be faulty, but agreed "that it is the legislature that is better suited to decide whether to recognize a cause of action for loss of a nonfatally injured child’s society." The court relied heavily on Dralle’s precedential value, and ruled that "plaintiffs in the case at bar have failed to demonstrate good cause … or compelling reasons … for departing from stare decisis."

Steve Merican is a sole practitioner in Oak Brook, Illinois. Steve’s practice is concentrated in appeals in state and federal courts. His URL is http://www.illinoislocalcounsel.com.