DCBA - Recent Case Law

Recent Case Law

By Steven R. Merican

Here are a few recent cases of importance and note - February 2002.

Beaubien v. Ryan, 2001 Ill. Lexis 1787, Docket Nos. 92701-08 (Sup. Ct. 12/27/01). Legislative redistricting map prepared by the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission is compact enough to pass constitutional muster. Original actions in the Illinois Supreme Court were filed to contest the constitutionality of certain reformulated legislative districts. The plaintiffs complained only that the districts did not meet the compactness requirement set out in the Illinois Constitution. This map was drawn by the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission because the General Assembly was "unwilling or unable to enact a new map within the time prescribed by law." A Commission map is "presumed to be valid and must be given the force and effect of law." Therefore, the burden was on the challengers to establish, by the manifest weight of the evidence, that the map was unconstitutional. Because "the population of Illinois is not distributed in homogenous, even spaced cells or grids . . . perfect or maximum compactness is not required." The court ruled that the plan adhered to the equality of population requirement, that it provided adequate representation to minorities and special interests, and that there was no dispute that it conformed to the legal requirements for political fairness.

M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 2001 Ill. Lexis 1784, Docket No. 90527 (Sup. Ct. 12/20/01). A general authorization to release medical records satisfied the federal regulations for release of alcohol and drug abuse patient records. Plaintiff applied for and was issued insurance for disability income. Within three months, he was admitted into Rush for treatment of alcohol dependence. While he was still at Rush, he initiated and withdrew a claim for benefits. The insurer sent Rush the consent to release records that plaintiff signed in making the application for insurance. Responding to the insurer’s request, Rush produced the records concerning plaintiff’s alcohol dependence treatment. The insurer then canceled the policy. Plaintiff sued the hospital for breach of physician-patient relationship, invasion of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Referring to the language of the general release, the court ruled that judgment on the pleadings was properly granted to the hospital. In an issue of first impression, the court ruled that the general consent satisfied section 523 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2, which mandates confidentiality of alcohol and drug abuse patient records, but creates conditions under which a patient may consent to disclosure. The court rejected arguments that the general consent did not meet the Act’s requirements for specificity and that the release of records that post-date the consent was improper.

Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2001 Ill. Lexis 1785, Docket No. 90850 (Sup. Ct. 12/20/01). A municipal ordinance in a home-rule municipality mirrored a state statute except that the ordinance did not provide a damages remedy. Plaintiff could seek damages against the municipality for violating the statute. Plaintiff, a real estate developer, submitted plans to raze a house and build two new houses on a plat of land in Naperville. The city did not act on the plans within 60 days from the submission, as required by section 11-12-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code and section 7-2-5:6 of the Naperville Municipal Code. The only substantive difference between the state statute and the city ordinance is the ordinance’s omission of a damages provision in the event the city fails to act on the plan within the 60-day requirement. Naperville argued that its ordinance trumped the statute, and that plaintiff therefore could not seek damages for the city’s failure to act within 60 days. But the court ruled that the ordinance does not supersede the statute: "The statute simply fills that gap by providing a recourse to stalled developers. The ordinance complements the statute; it does not limit sub silencio statutory remedies."

People v. Ryan, 2001 Ill. App. Lexis 922, Nos. 1-99-3522 and 1-00-3217 (App. 12/13/01). A successive motion to vacate a dismissal for want of prosecution does not toll the time to file a notice of appeal. In November 1998, Counts II, III, and IV of the State’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. That dismissal did not contain Rule 304(a) language, so it was not final and appealable. Count I was dismissed in April 1999 for want of prosecution. The State’s motion to reconsider and vacate the DWP was denied on June 2, 1999. The State made another motion to reconsider, which was denied on August 31, 1999. The State then filed a notice of appeal of the dismissal of Counts II through IV on September 30, 1999. That appeal was premature because "a DWP order does not operate as a final order and does not terminate the litigation because the party has an absolute right to refile its action within one year pursuant to the savings statute . . . ." However, the second notice of appeal was filed too late to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court. The court ruled that the one-year savings period began to run on June 2, 1999, the date the first motion to reconsider was denied, not from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration on August 31, 1999. Therefore, the matter became final and appealable on June 2, 2000. The court ruled that ". . . it is clear that the filing of the successive motion does not toll the one-year limitations period . . . Otherwise, the limitations period could be theoretically extended for an indefinite period of time until the successive motions are heard and denied."

Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union 130 v. Dept. of Public Health, 2001 Ill. App. Lexis 1467, Nos. 1-00-3384, 1-00-1357 (App. 12/21/01). Residence address of individuals who are licensed by the State is not personal information that is exempt under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act. Through a FOIA request, the union requested the home addresses of all individuals who are licensed as plumbers and apprentice plumbers in Cook and Will Counties. The Illinois Department of Health took the position that home addresses were personal information that was exempt under FOIA. The Department did not have business addresses for the plumbers. Affirming a summary judgment in favor of the union, the court ruled that the plumbers’ home addresses was not exempt because it concerned "only basic identification of a plumber[,] not private, confidential or personal information . . . ."

Steve Merican is a sole practitioner in Oak Brook, Illinois. Steve’s practice is concentrated in appeals in state and federal courts. His URL is www.illinoislocalcounsel.com.