Following are summaries of selected opinions recently issued by the Illinois Supreme Court.

People v. Tyreese Roberts (Justice Kilbride).

Facts: Tyreese was charged and tried for complicity in a drive by shooting. One of the witnesses called on his behalf was Michael Phillips. Phillips had conversed with a juror outside of court (but did not discuss the case). The juror, after deliberation and after two votes by the panel, notified the judge that she was too afraid to continue serving on the panel. She was queried by the court and then dismissed. The court replaced her with an alternate and after additional deliberation the defendant was convicted.

Issue: Whether replacement of a discharged juror with an alternate juror after a case is submitted to the jury is permissible under Illinois Law.

Holding: Post submission of a juror is permissible under some circumstances, and the decision to proceed is left to the discretion of the court.

Rationale: Supreme court rule 434 (e) and Section 115-4(g) each allow for replacement of a juror who is discharged or dies before submission of a case to the jury. The replacement of a discharged juror is not addressed by these provisions.

The court refused to apply the doctrine of expression unius est exclusion alterius to these statutes.

There is nothing in the language of the statutes to indicate a legislative intent to preclude use of alternated jurors after submission of the case to the jury. Therefore these provisions do not prohibit post submission replacement of a juror.

In the absence of express prohibition, this matter is left to the discretion of the court.

The primary test for abuse of discretion will be the potential prejudice to the defendant resulting from post submission replacement of a juror.

In this case, the court found prejudice and reversed the conviction.

People v. James Jones (Justice Garman Opinion)

Facts: Defendant after celebrating a little too much and exercising the excellent choice of driving after doing so, got himself into an automobile accident that did not result in death or injury to another party. A police officer responded to the scene, but instead of performing a field sobriety test, summoned an ambulance to transport the defendant to a hospital. At the hospital, the officer read the statutory summary suspension warning to the defendant who objected to chemical testing but did not physically resist. Both urine an blood were provided but not for purposes of medical treatment. At trial defendant moved to suppress the test results. The governing statute specifically provided that when the investigating officer has probable cause that a DUI has Chassid death or injury to another that he may order chemical testing. The trial court ruled that in the absence of dearth or injury to another the defendant has a statutory right to refuse testing subject to the administrative suspension for doing so.

Issue: Does Sect. 11-501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code grant a statutory right to refuse chemical testing to a DUI arrestee in a situation where death or personal injury to another is not involved?

Holding: No such right exists.

Rationale: Sect. 11-501.2 IVC clearly allows non-concensual chemical testing where a police officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle driven by an individual under the influence has caused the death or personal injury of another. The statute is silent on situations not involving death or personal injury to another.

The US Supreme Court previously held that a blood sample drawn without defendant’s consent does not violate the 4th amendment to the USC. Schmerber v. Cal.

Since there were no constitutional bars to admissibility the issue remaining is legislative intent. The court then summarized the legislative history of the statute.

The 1975 version of the statute explicitly required consent as a predicate to admissibility.

The 1982 version retained the right to refuse but held that evidence of refusal was admissible.

The statute was amended in 1986 to provide for non-concensual testing where death or injury is involved.

Since the legislature repeatedly restricted the right to refuse, legislative intent to preserve the right of refusal cannot be inferred from the fact that the statute is silent on instances where death or injury to another is not involved.

City of champaign vs. Torres (Justice Karmeier)

Facts: Defendant, a 21 year old University Student, was at a noisy party to which the police were summoned. Notwithstanding his academic intelligence, he had the poor judgment to (1) answer the door when the police were knocking on it (2) give the police a hard time (3) attempt to close the door on a police officer striking the officer’s arm with the door, all of which led to his arrest under an ordinance that prohibits obstruction of the local constabulary while in the performance of their duties. With the assistance of the student legal aid, the young scholar took his $175 fine all the way up the Illinois Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the fourth amendment as applied to the circumstances of this case creates a defense to obstruction of a peace officer.

Holding: The fourth amendment restriction on unreasonable searches does not apply to the facts of this case, so that the defendant’s conviction of an ordinance violation must be sustained.

Rationale: Defendant argued that the conduct of the police officer was unauthorized because he was engaged in a warrantless search of a home; therefore, he had a legal right to resist.

At common law, a person had the right to use reasonable force to resist an illegal arrest. This common law rule was repealed by enactment of Section 7-7 of the criminal code which prohibits the use of force to resist even an unlawful arrest. However, this statute does not apply to warrantless, non-concensual entry into a home, which are not authorized acts. Therefore, the applicable statute does not prohibit reasonable force to prevent an officer an unconstitutional entry into a person’s living quarters. (The court then noted, after this lengthy analysis, that the criminal code was not in issue because conviction under an ordinance violation was before the court).

Having exhausted itself on an inapposite statutory analysis the court then turned to a fourth amendment analysis.

A guest on someone else’s property does not have standing to contest the legality of a search. (People v. Nimbly)

The fourth amendment protects people not places (citing Katz v. US)

The defendant would have to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy which as a mere party guest he could not do.

People V. Collins (Justice Fitzgerald)

Facts: Early New Year’s Day, two police officers heard multiple gun shots. After an investigation, the police arrested the defendant for shooting his firearm into the air as his personal version of a New Year’s Celebration. The defendant was charged with and convicted of reckless discharge of a firearm.

Issue: Whether conviction for reckless discharge of a firearm requires proof that the bullets fired from defendant’s gun actually endangered an individual

Holding: Defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence showed that he discharged live rounds of ammunition into the air.

Rationale: The offense of reckless discharge of a firearm is committed when the defendant recklessly discharges a firearm and endangers the bodily safety of an individual. Since the statute does not define endanger, the court turned to the dictionary. Applying a dictionary to this case, the State is required to prove that defendant’s reckless conduct created a dangerous situation that placed an individual in peril of probable harm or loss.

The court also compared the language of statutes for the charge of aggravated discharge of a firearm and the charge of reckless discharge of a firearm.

The aggravated discharge of a firearm statute contains, as an element, that an individual knowingly points a firearm at another person. The reckless discharge of a firearm statute does not contain this element.

To require that a gun actually be pointed at someone or that an individual actually be exposed to bullets would render one of the statutes superfluous. This clearly was not the legislature’s intent.